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COMMON LAW RESTITUTION IN THE MIS-
SISSIPPI TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: DID
THE SMOKE GET IN THEIR EYES?
Doug Rendleman*
Consider the following hypothetical. In 1994, in the ivory tower
of a law school, a newly-minted law professor discovers a scholarly
subject she believes is sufficiently "paradigm-shifting" to earn her
tenure. The paradigm in tobacco products liability litigation, which
has been "tobacco companies win," will, she thinks, crumble. She
launches the first of a series of heavily-footnoted articles into the
law review sea. A state government which has paid Medicaid for
eligible citizens' tobacco-caused infirmities may, she contends,
recover restitution from the tobacco companies that sold the tobacco.
Her articles argue that the tobacco companies have been unjustly
enriched or benefitted because the state's Medicaid payments saved
them the money they ought to have paid the smokers. In addition
to preventing the tobacco companies' unjust enrichment, restitution
of the tobacco companies' savings to the state government will
advance two of the common law's major goals: it will align legal
rules with social aspirations, and it will internalize a significant
externality.
If these articles had been written and if the leading lights in the
fraternity of scholarly restitution studies had examined them as
"outside reviewers" in the professor's tenure review, the publications
would probably have been called "dreamy" and found "deficient"-
two of the reviewers' kindest statements-and would not have
qualified her under her law school's tenure standard. In short, the
law schoors paradigm would not have budged and the professor may
* Huntley Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. I thank the
Frances Lewis Law Center for supporting my research, Ms. Danielle Smith for helping with
the footnotes, and the Georgia Law Review staff. I dedicate this article to the memory of my
late mother, Mrs. Odetta Rendleman, who helped me think I could add something to the




even have been advised to seek other employment. But this is a
hypothetical ivory tower.
Cut now to the real world. In 1994, in isolated Mississippi,
thirteen law firms began the Medicaid restitution action against the
tobacco companies summarized above.1 They filed in Chancery, on
behalf of the State of Mississippi in the name of the State's attorney
general.2 Thirty-nine other states' attorneys general's Medicaid
recovery actions followed. The Mississippi lawsuit was settled in
July of 1997 for $3.3 billion over twenty-five years and a "most
favored nation" clause, under which other states' more favorable
later settlements augmented Mississippi's recovery.3 After the
"global" 1997 settlement foundered in Congress, the other states'
attorneys general's lawsuits were settled in 1998. The unsuccessful
1997 settlement differed from the successful 1998 settlement in a
crucial way: the legislation implementing the 1997 settlement
would have circumscribed smokers' products liability actions against
tobacco companies, but the 1998 settlement does not.
The 1998 settlement left to the states the question of how to
spend the $206 billion plus the separate settlements, including
Mississippi's, which the tobacco companies agreed to pay.4 Shortly
before Christmas 1998, an arbitration panel assessed the Missis-
sippi law firms' attorney fees at more than $1.4 billion.5 One
Mississippi firm is scheduled to receive $874 million from the
Mississippi settlement and its role in two other settlements, with
the likelihood of more to come later.' Creativity counts, for the old
paradigm "tobacco companies win," if it has not shifted, has at least
twitched.
One provocative question the settlements left unanswered is
Professor Tom Mason's: whether the facts really would have
Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed May 23, 1994)
(No. 94-1429) (source on file with author).
2 Id.
' Mississippi Law Firm to Receive $874Million from Tobacco Pacts, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
1998, at A26.
I Sandra Torry, Anti-Smoking Efforts Getting Little From Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
1999, at A3.
' Sandra Torry, Huge Fees for Anti-Tobacco Lawyers: Cigarette Firms Call Record $8
Billion Award "Outrageous," WASH. POST, Dec. 12 1998, at Al.
6 Mississippi Law Firm to Receive $874 Million from Tobacco Pacts, supra note 3.
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supported restitution recovery from the tobacco companies to the
State of Mississippi.7  To speculate about an answer to Professor
Mason's question requires me to inquire whether the State's
restitution theory would be viable under the common law of
restitution. This Article focuses on restitution and indemnity
because combined they comprised the keystone of the State's
substantive doctrines. This piece of the whole complex tobacco
controversy is small enough to comprehend in a journal article, yet
large enough to have set the compass for many other states'
attorney generals' suits and for the states' ultimate 1998 settlement.
In addition to the mammoth stakes, the restitution issue itself is
worth examining to evaluate the quality of the State's and the
tobacco companies' analysis and the nature of common law change.
In addition to Mississippi, several other states' Medicaid recovery
lawsuits had counts for unjust enrichment, restitution, or indem-
nity, including Oklahoma,8 New Jersey, 9 and Iowa."0 Alabama's
private attorney general lawsuit contains a restitution count."
There is an analogous unjust enrichment case in the United
Kingdom where private medical insurers can subrogate to an
insured's tort claim and recoup the cost, but the National Health
Service cannot.
1 2
' Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Settlemen" Practical Implications and the Future of the
Tort Law, 67 MISS. L.J. 847, 881 (1998) [hereinafter Practical Implicatons].
8 3 Industry Law Firms Named in Oklahoma's Medicaid Recovery Action, 10 n.9
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP., Tobacco 12, Sept. 6, 1996.
' 15 States Now Seek Medicaid Recovery from Tobacco Industry; Iowa is the Latest, 10
n.16 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: Tobacco 19, Dec. 19, 1996.
" 19 States Now Seek Medicaid Recovery from Tobacco Industry; Iowa is the Latest, 10
n.16 MEALEY'SLITIG. REP.: Tobacco 19, Sept. 6, 1996. See Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris
Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998), for a case where the trial judge granted defendants' motion
to dismiss the state's unjust enrichment-restitution count, and, on appeal, the state did not
contest that dismissal. The statutory "indemnity" provision, the Iowa Supreme Court held,
is exclusive, and the state has no common law right to indemnity because the prerequisites,
"an express contract, vicarious liability, or breach of an independent duty of the indemnitor
to the indemnitee," were absent. Id. at 406. The damages were too remote. Id. Employers'
or insurers' claims against the tobacco company for an employee's or insured's tobacco-caused
medical expenses were too remote. Id. at 407.
" AlabamaAttorney General Won't Sue Industry overMedicaid, So Lt. Gov. Does, 10 n.9
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: Tobacco 19, Sept. 6, 1996.
2 Geraint Howells, Tobacco Litigation in the U.S. - Its Impact in the United Kingdom,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 693, 698-99 (1998).
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Other states consciously developed their own substantive law.
One attorney general even observed, "[w]e don't have any courts of
chancery in Minnesota. I'm not sure we know how to spell it."13
Other substantive theories were conspiracy, concealment, consumer
protection, deceptive advertising and trade practices, state anti-
trust, and federal RICO."'
Foreshadowing my answer to Professor Mason's question, I will
conclude that the State's success with common law restitution in a
court of last resort was far from certain. This conclusion propels me
to examine the anomaly of how a theory of restitution too "dreamy"
for the world of "creative" scholars and courts of last resort might
induce the profit-motivated leaders of business corporations to
shovel billions of dollars at the states. It leads me to discuss
common law change and to develop some conclusions about the role
of settlement in legal change.
In the consensual Mississippi settlement, the tobacco companies
appear to have paid the State's contested claims in a discounted
amount; the compromise indicates the litigants settled the issue of
liability. The companies who compromised a legally and factually
controverted claim may appear to have been indifferent to definitive
legal answers; they seem to have settled the lawsuit amidst doubt
about the substantive law and the facts. If the tobacco companies
knew of their uncertainty, they waived their right to have the issues
adjudicated later and they assumed the risk that the substantive"
law does not support the State's recovery.
That the tobacco companies ponied up without definitively
resolving the substantive law questions might compel an observer
to inquire as to why substantive law is important. If the tobacco
companies didn't care, in other words, why should anyone? Why
should you? The quality of the tobacco companies' legal analysis,
which I will examine, bears directly on the wisdom of their decision
to settle. The settlement is a vital piece of the public policy debate
focused on tobacco.





Indifference to the substantive law in the attorney generals'
Medicaid recovery litigation is widespread, and it features endemic
references to the Medicaid restitution litigation as "tort." For
example, the speakers at the panel discussion at the University of
Mississippi School of Law in October 1997, which triggered Profes-
sor Mason's question, included the State's principal lawyers,
Richard Scruggs and Attorney General Michael Moore. 15 The
program was nevertheless inaccurately named The Tobacco
Settlement: Practical Implications and the Future of Tort Law.'6
Almost at the end of the more than thirty pages of complete
transcript, Richard Scruggs, incidentally to answering a question
about alcohol, finally disabused the sponsor about the accuracy of
the title. "The Mississippi case," Scruggs remonstrated, "was not a
tort case."' 7 He mentions the State's substantive theories without
much explanation, and twice more in the same answer repeats,
"[i]t's not a tort case... [t]his was not a tort case."' 8
Commentators exacerbate observers' confusion when they refer
to the attorneys general's Medicaid recovery litigation as mass
torts. 9 The lawsuits, however, are neither mass nor torts. If "mass"
means multiple plaintiffs, the Mississippi lawsuit is not mass
anything, for although factually and legally complex, it was pursued
by a single plaintiff. Nor is the Mississippi lawsuit a tort action,
except in the most general usage of the word "tort" to mean a
noncontractual civil wrong."0 In fact, the State sought restitution
precisely because hundreds of smokers and deceased smokers'
families who had sued the tobacco companies for tort damages
under products liability failed.2
"s Practical Implications, supra note 7, at 847.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 871.
IS Id. at 871-72.
,9 See, e.g., Richard Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass
Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1124, 1126, 1152, 1185 n.258 (1998) (discussing proposals for
settlement in attorneys general's suits as mass tort settlements).
'o 'Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1984). The State's suit seeks
restitution, however, not "damages."
"' Practical Implications, supra note 15, at 871-72.
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Scruggs may have protested in vain, for in addition to tort
nomenclature, articulation of tort policy goals for the Medicaid
recovery lawsuits seems habitual. The authors of a recent Trial
article argued against legislation and pronounced the goals of the
attorneys general's lawsuits as tort policies-compensation,
deterrence, and "justice"S2 -- not restitution policy, prevention of the
defendants' unjust enrichment.
All the participants in complex litigation tend to lose track of the
substantive core. Discussion of the Medicaid recovery lawsuits,
while downgrading substantive law, has centered on ancillary issues
such as the gargantuan attorney fees and secrecy-privilege issues in
discovery. The procedural issue of standing was crucial to the
Mississippi suit.2 In tobacco litigation, the discovery process has
served a vital publicity function, with thirty-three million pages of
internal tobacco industry documents important for public notice and
crucial to understanding.
24
I. THE MississipPi RESTITUTION THEORY
The named plaintiff in the Mississippi Chancery lawsuit is the
State's Attorney General.25 The complaint has four substantive-
remedial counts, restitution-unjust enrichment,26 indemnity,27 public
nuisance,28 and injunction.29 The first three counts seek money
recovery from the tobacco companies on behalf of the State.3" The
injunction is the State's parens patriae remedy to protect the future
' Richard Daynard & Graham Kelder, The Many Virtues of Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL,
Nov. 1998, at 34.
'2 In re Fordice, 691 So.2d 429, 433 (Miss. 1997) (stating that petitioner serving in his
capacity as Governor does not meet statutory standing requirements to sue for mandamus);
In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So.2d 424,426-27 (Miss. 1997) (stating that court would
not issue writ of mandamus to require Chancery Court to dismiss suit against tobacco
companies because it was brought by Attorney General).
24 Hubert Humphrey II, supra note 13, at 474.
Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed May 23, 1994)
(No. 94-1429).
26 Id. at 32.
27 Id. at 34.
28 Id. at 36.
2 Id. at 37.
30 Id. at 34-36.
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health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.3' Our topic is the State's
restitution theory, including indemnity.
The State's restitution count alleges the tobacco companies are
knowingly promoting and selling an addictive and harmful product
to smokers in the State, which, when used as intended, leads to
addiction, harms addicted people, and creates medical expense. 2
The State's Medicaid program pays some of the smokers' tobacco-
related medical expenses, as do the State's own welfare program
and its employees' health benefits. 3 The State argues that the
tobacco companies prospered wrongfully by not paying the medical
costs caused by tobacco; instead, tobacco's health costs are borne by
the smokers themselves, their families, their insurance companies,
and the government's social safety net, including Medicaid.34 By
evading these medical costs, the product's true expenses, the tobacco
companies were unjustly enriched.35 The State, having paid some
of tobacco's health costs, should be able to recover restitution from
the tobacco companies to prevent their unjust enrichment.36
Count One for restitution-unjust enrichment picks up the thread
and develops it as follows:
Many of the State's citizens who are afflicted with
tobacco-related diseases are poor, undereducated, and
unable to provide for their own medical care. These
citizens rely upon the State to provide their medical
care, which reliance results in an extreme burden on the
taxpayers and the financial resources of this State. Yet,
these very citizens, along with our youth, are targeted by
tobacco promotional techniques. Mississippi taxpayers
have thus unofficiously expended hundreds of millions
of dollars in caring for their fellow citizens who have and
are suffering from lung cancer; cardiovascular disease;
emphysema; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; and
' Id. at 37-38.
3 Id. at 29-31.
Id.
34 Id.




a variety of other cancers and diseases that were and are
caused by cigarettes. While Mississippi is perhaps the
poorest state in the Union in per capita income, Missis-
sippians lead the nation in their incidence of coronary
heart disease, a disease which is directly related to
cigarette smoking.
While the State and its various agencies and institu-
tions are struggling to pay for the health care costs of
tobacco, the tobacco cartel continues to reap billions of
dollars in profits from the sale of cigarettes. Tax reve-
nues generated by the cigarette smokers help defray but
a tiny fraction of the health care costs resulting from
tobacco use in this state.
The defendants are able legally to promote the sale of
their cigarettes to the citizens of Mississippi by continu-
ing to misinform the federal and State authorities about
the true carcinogenic, pathologic and addictive qualities
of cigarettes. Instead of honestly disclosing the genuine
health risks of smoking cigarettes, the tobacco compa-
nies have spent billions in slick, sophisticated marketing
tactics designed to make smoking appear to be glamor-
ous to our youngsters.
In equity and fairness, it is the defendants, not the
taxpayers of Mississippi, who should bear the costs of
tobacco inflicted diseases. By avoiding their own duties
to stand financially responsible for the harm done by
their cigarettes, the defendants wrongfully have forced
the State of Mississippi to perform such duties and to
pay the health care costs of tobacco-related disease. As
a result, the defendants have been unjustly enriched to
the extent that Mississippi's taxpayers have had to pay
these costs.
37
The State's Count Two is for indemnity;38 for our purposes
indemnity resembles restitution enough to be called a restitution
37 Id.
38 Id. at 34-36.
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claim, summarized and discussed as follows. The tobacco companies
are primarily liable for smokers' tobacco-related medical expenses.3 9
The State is secondarily liable for these expenses under its pro-
grams.4" When the State with secondary liability discharged its
responsibility with Medicaid payments to infirm smokers, that
occurrence unjustly enriched the tobacco companies which were
primarily liable; the tobacco companies' unjust enrichment gave rise
to their duty to pay indemnity to the State.4
The relief the State seeks under the restitution-indemnity counts
money recovery labeled "damages," pre-judgment interest, attorney
fees, expert witness fees, costs, and punitive damages.42 The
restitution-indemnity counts close with a prayer for general
equitable relief, for an "effective remedy.., as the court deems just
and proper."43
II. DEEP STRUCTURE: THE COMMON LAW
The common law which came with the colonists from England in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries remains part of the
structure of the United States states' legal culture. The common
law process's central ideas are adversary procedure, the lay jury,
and judicial development through reasoned articulation. All three
10 Id.
40 Id.
4' Id. The State's Count Three for public nuisance is conclusory and seeks the same
relief as the two restitution counts. Id. at 36. The State's public nuisance count also
resembles a restitution theory. The tobacco companies' addictive and harmful product caused
a public nuisance by interfering with public health. Id. The State abated the nuisance when
it paid some of the smokers' expenses. Id. Therefore, the State may recover those payments
from the tobacco companies. Id. Normally, however, a public nuisance comes from the way
defendants use property, not from the sale of a product. Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14
F. Supp. 2d 956, 972-73 (E.D. Tex. 1997). Count Four is based on the State's duty to protect
its citizens, not on the State's right to be reimbursed. Id. at 37. After assailing the tobacco
companies' advertising and sales to children, it seeks an injunction. Id. at 37-38.
42 Id. at 34-35.
4 Id.; see Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale
Objections to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REV. 591, 594-98
(1994) (articulating sympathetic summary of the Mississippi complaint).
1999] 855
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
are important here, but adversary procedure and law development
by judges are central.
44
The United States states' common law, as used in this Article,
includes both "law" and "equity." Its nucleus is comprised of the
private law subjects courts originated, maintained, and developed,
including property, contracts, and torts.45 Judges used common law
techniques to form and evolve our subject-restitution-which is
another of the common law's subjects as I am using it.
The common law which originated in feudal England predates the
rise of representative government based on elections. It grew out of
a system of government that the states of the future United States
rejected in a lengthy revolution. The conservative continuity of the
English common law courts' technique and its subjects, property,
contracts, torts, and restitution, presents modern courts with an
enigma.
The common law process is government through courts in action.
Designed and administered for the good of the community as a
whole, the common law requires substantial support in the polity.
Our analysis of governmental policymaking begins with constitu-
tions and representative government based on elections, which lead
us to seek principles of confinement of judicially created common
law rules. For one thing, even though many state judges are
elected, courts cannot run too far in front of public opinion. Judicial
formation of common law rules without open political debate colors
controversial decisions with questions about legitimacy.
Judges' rhetoric associated with creatively developing the
common law typically includes statements of both disinclination to
enlarge common law and deference to the legislature. Courts today
develop the common law at the sufferance of legislatures, which
have the last word, within constitutional limits. In the sense used
here, common law is state law.46 Today common law subjects have
44 see NORMAN CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 196 (1997) (It was how attorneys presented the issue in the
case and how judges responded to this presentation and instructed the jury that was far more
important now.").
45 See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (5th ed. 1998) (stating
in an economic sense common law consists of property, contract, and tort law).




a statutory component; for example, the statutory component of
contracts is the Uniform Commercial Code.
The common law court's formal or primary sources are the
jurisdiction's binding precedents and its statutes. Courts' secondary
authoritative sources for the common law are judicial decisions from
other jurisdictions and other professional sources, including law
reviews, treatises, and restatements. A Restatement of Restitution,
4
7
our subject, was published in 1937. Two tentative drafts for a
second Restatement were circulated in the 1980s before the project
was abandoned, and a new Restatement, numbered third, has
begun.48
One of the principal common law practices is to allocate decisions
and entrust authority, at least initially, to judges. Common law
courts simultaneously settle the litigants' disputes and, through
their decisions, generate rules for future disputes. The Mississippi
Supreme Court claims responsibility for the state's common law.
"The common law is the perfection of reason."4 s When a common
law rule ceases to be "reasonable and just," it ceases to be part of
Mississippi common law.50 Rules "unsuited to our conditions, or
repugnant to the spirit of our institutions" are not part of Missis-
sippi common law.5'
Judges develop common law rules in response to lawyers'
arguments. To advance a client's cause, the creative advocate will
accept the Mississippi Supreme Court's invitation to argue in favor
of a "reasonable and just" decision and against a rule "unsuited to
our conditions or repugnant to the spirit of our institutions."52 The
lawyer's argument will perforce transcend the unsuitable existing
rules and categories; it will identify the social and political environ-
ment, formulate the underlying policies, and articulate just and
reasoned alternative doctrine. The judges developing the common
17 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1998). Until it is
officially considered, the preliminary draft is not American Law Institute policy. The author
is an advisor to this Restatement.






law perforce focus their eyes above the content of rules; they will
consider, in addition, economic, moral, and administrative factors.
The State's lawyers understood the common law's creative
possibilities well enough to make imaginative connections to
alternative formulations of rules and to articulate the moral and
economic arguments for recovery. Many lawyers, however, think
within settled categories, do not perceive analogies among the fields,
and cannot conceive shifting a dispute from one field to another.
Perhaps because the existing law appeared to favor their clients, the
tobacco companies' lawyers stated the common law as unchanging.
The tobacco companies' argument postulated a rule structure that
Professor Schauer described as so stable that a court may not
impose liability "unless the grounds for liability [are] apparent in
the existing set of legal rules.""3 By another way of looking at it,
however, the tobacco companies' lawyers never seemed to catch on
to the State's creative approach.
Stability and predictability which encourage market transactions
are facilitated by the common law doctrine of stare decisis-find out
what we did last time and decide the dispute according to the
precedent articulated in the earlier decision. Precedent guides
peoples' behavior; those who understand how past disputes have
been decided know their legal rights and may bargain and plan their
activities accordingly. Under the doctrine of precedent, an earlier
decision is, without referring to its content, a reason for a judge to
decide a similar later dispute the same way.
5 4
Stability and predictability, although important attributes of the
common law system, are not its only attributes. Rules embedded in
decisions about past disputes are always ambiguous. Times and
needs change. Legal doctrine, which never exactly reflects changing
social realities, lags behind social change. Future disputes probe
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 195 n.38 (1991).
"4 Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 312 (Va. 1999). The
Virginia doctrine of stare decisis is so strong that the state supreme court says it will not
"ignore"' a precedent "in the absence of flagrant error or mistake." Id. That court, it seems,
will follow a precedent which is merely an "error or mistake" and will only depart from it if
the error or mistake is "flagrant."
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that ambiguity and test whether the judges see differences or
similarities.
Adopting to economic and cultural change is also one of the
common law's features. Another is the flexibility and ability of
courts to tailor a solution in a particular dispute. The faster a
society is changing, the less effect earlier decisions have. Prece-
dents become irrelevant, or worse, incorrect. From time to time, the
common law's features come into conflict. While legal stability
usually facilitates market transactions, sometimes the public begins
to view the adverse consequences of economic activity as insupport-
able.
The tobacco companies' view of unchanging legal rules belongs to
the tradition Professor Schauer refers to as seeking "stability for
stability's sake, unwillingness to trust decisionmakers to depart too
drastically from the past, and a conservatism committed to the view
that changes from the past are more likely to be for the worse than
for the better."55 As Professor Leon Green observed, however,
"Doctrine for doctrine's sake may become an obsession with lawyers
as it does with preachers and politicians. It feeds on itself; hardens
into cliches and blocks the arteries of thought. It may be identified
as law and become sacrosanct. The more passionately embraced the
deadlier its kiss.
' 56
III. THE TECHNIQUES OF COMMON LAW CHANGE
The common law, creative, always incomplete and in conflict with
itself, absorbed and adopted historical, scientific, and political
change. In order to last for centuries, the judges' reasoned articula-
tion had to profess stability while accommodating change. In
response to disputes and lawyers' arguments, the judges worked out
common law principles and procedures. Proponents of the idea that
while applying the common law rules the judge changes them accept
the uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability necessary to
achieve flexibility and correct decisions in particular disputes.
' SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 174.
Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx. L. REV. 257, 266 (1960).
8591999]
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In practice common law rules which include the practice of
following precedent have presumptive, but not conclusive, force.
Common law judges alter known, existing rules when the features
of the particular dispute persuade them to do so. The judge may
"modify the previous rule at the moment of application."57 Judges'
reasoned articulation usually takes several incremental steps in a
series of decisions to develop a new rule. At some point, an observer
can say a new rule has emerged. A legal rule's status cannot be
determined solely by examining its content.
The common law, as we know it, simultaneously emerges from
and fosters a market economy. Common law doctrines define
litigants' property and contract rights in ways that encourage future
market transactions. Common law solutions often resemble market
solutions. When something happens outside the market and injures
someone, common law tort rules frequently charge the person who
might better have prevented the loss or insured against it; this
liability for damages in turn encourages potential defendants to
take cost-effective precautions. Thus, one of common law courts'
important economic functions is to internalize externalities.
A common law court will favor respect and accuracy over
predictability, stability, or reliance. The practices of the common
law give the judge the authority to change the rules, but not to
change the practices of the common law. The judge should apply the
rule unless the judge is persuaded that a "particularly exigent
reason" exists to change it. 58 The best answer requires a new rule.
Professor Melvin Eisenberg's terminology, which influenced much
of what comes below, differs a little from the preceding vocabulary.
According to him, rules are "doctrinal propositions."59 The overarch-
ing justifications, reasons, and policies are "social propositions."60
The common law's answers are usually, but not always, found in
rules stated in prior court decisions.61 The common law "consists of
the rules that would be generated at the present moment by
application of the institutional principles [that govern common law]
57 SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 175.
" Id. at 2-3.
59 MELVIN ARON EISENBERO, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (1988).
6 Id. at 1-2.
61 Id. at 148-49.
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adjudication."62 Although social propositions always figure into
common law decisions, a court's most difficult decisions are those
where social propositions are incongruent with doctrinal rules.63
Courts may overturn defunct doctrinal rules and establish
doctrinal rules more nearly congruent with moral and economic
principles. Common law courts have only the blunt tools of judicial
remedies-money recovery, damages, restitution, injunctions, and
other personal orders. Some social problems are not amenable to
the common law technique and judicial remedies. Legislatures
correct common law courts' excesses and omissions; they do things
courts either cannot do or do only poorly; they draw distinct lines,
define crimes, establish taxes, enact subsidies, and create bureau-
cracies.
Professor Leon Green stressed the creative and regenerative
nature of the common law.
Precedents are the seeds of the law and nothing so
quickly displaces the parent stalk as does its own seeds.
It is through precedent that the law responds to the
living world. Whether the response shall be adequate
may well depend upon its choice and use, but that in
turn depends upon the lawyer, judge or administrator
whose power it is to make the choice. As the desires of
people grow and proliferate endlessly requiring the
protection of law, conflicts must be adjusted, modifica-
tions made of old right and old law. There is no place to
stop. Stare decisis is an illusion. It can exist but
momentarily in other than a dead society. In a world of
living, restless, venturesome, and inventive people the
work of the law and of lawyers is never done.64
The structure of the common law begins with principles, reasons,
and justifications. Then it moves from justifications to the narrower
rules used to decide disputes. Finally, it moves from rules to results
.,2 Id. at 154.
Id. at 2-3.
Leon Green, The Regenerative Process in Tort Law, 33 IND. L. REv. 166, 180 (1958).
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in particular disputes. Commentators discussing the technique of
change focus on the relationship between the justifications and the
rules.65 Rules which are sometimes over-inclusive and sometimes
under-inclusive identify and isolate sometimes more and sometimes
less conduct than would be necessary to serve the justification for
the rule. A decision faithful to a rule may not be faithful to the
justification for the rule. Narrow rules are under-inclusive, as they
leave the victims of particular instances of "injustice" remediless; in
other words, when the rule's justification would support a plaintiffs
relief, but the rule does not, there exists a wrong without a remedy.
In 1994, when Mississippi's Medicaid recovery action was filed,
many observers thought that form of litigation was where tobacco
products liability litigation was mired.
When a justification points to a decision in one direction but the
rule points in a different direction, the court may either follow the
rule or change it. Several significant social benefits flow from
following established rules: predictability, stability, reliance,
efficiency, allocation of power, and constraint on decisionmakers.
These benefits are important enough to sustain some decisions
based on the rules independent of the other reasons for them. In
decisionmaking based strictly on rules, the judge decides a dispute
according to the rule even when the decision differs from the
decision he or she would make by applying the justification for the
rule. Professor Schauer, advocating what he named "presumptive
positivism," says society ought to accept some of these results as a
"cost" of the stability and predictability it achieves with precise
rules.66 Rule-based decisionmaking exists, he says, when the judge
resolves a dispute on a rule and resists efforts to ignore it even
though following the rule's justification would lead the court to
decide differently.6
Rule-based systems have a diminished capacity to adapt to the
changing times, to deal with unpredicted twists. Are the govern-
ment and the people "willing to tolerate suboptimal results in order
0 See EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 151-53 (discussing technique of common law
change); SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 8-9 (relating formulation ofjudicial rules to justification
for those rules).
66 SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 54, 72.
67 Id. at 76.
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that those affected by the decisions... will be able to plan certain
aspects of their lives? '68 Professor Schauer answers his own
question. Reversing Justice Brandeis's famous quotation,69 he says,
"Sometimes it is more important that things be settled correctly
than that they be settled for the sake of settlement."7 Common law
judges revise past rules in the process of applying them to particular
disputes. The court may interpret the rule, expand a rule to include
more conduct, shrink it to include less, abandon a rule, choose one
rule over another, or classify a dispute under a different rule. The
court's judicial techniques maybe called distinguishing, overruling,
and characterization.
When should a common law court depart from or overrule an
earlier decision? The court should dispense with an earlier decision,
Professor Eisenberg maintains, when the contested doctrine fails
substantially the tests of social congruence and systemic consis-
tency, and when the values of stability and stare decisis would be no
better served by keeping the rule than by overruling it. 1 The latter
values are evenhandedness, protecting justified reliance, preventing
unfair surprise, replicability, and support."'
Scholars' articles detecting the "wrong without a remedy"
mentioned above protested the paradigm "tobacco companies win."
They argued that for smokers' lawsuits, the law of products liability
is too narrow and it should be defined more expansively to support
smokers' tort recovery from tobacco companies."3
The State of Mississippi's argument in the Medicaid restitution
lawsuit was more creative than "reverse prior decisions," or "expand
tort liability." The State first maintained the matter was restitution
case in Chancery. The State's technique I call characterization
68 Id. at 140.
' Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
C'[]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right").
70 SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 142.
71 EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 44-47.
'2 Id. at 47-49.
" David Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in
the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241 (1994); Frank Vandall, The American Law
Institute is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRAL. REV. 801 (1998); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke
Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).
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differs from a request to overrule. Commentators have focused on
overruling an earlier decision. How does the State's novel charac-
terization differ from overruling?
IV. CHARACTERIZATION: THE LAWYER'S
PART, NAMES AFFECT IDEAS
The common law is divided into subject categories named
property, contract, tort, and restitution, each with its particular
structure of liability rules or doctrine based on overarching policy
and justifications. Although most disputes fall clearly into one
subject or another, the categories are not self-defining. If a dispute
has attributes of more than one subject, someone must decide which
subject's set of rules and justifications governs. Typically, in the
technique I am calling characterization, each litigant identifies a
favorable category and stresses the features of the dispute, to
convince the court to classify the dispute in what the litigant expects
will be a beneficial way.
When the common law has categories labeled tort and restitution,
with different characteristics for litigants-for the State, likely a
lack of recovery in tort versus possible recovery in restitution-then
the adversary system with lawyers vigorously representing clients
will put pressure on the boundaries between the categories. The
State's lawyers began with a litigation paradigm: smokers lose
products liability lawsuits in tort against tobacco companies. The
State changed the plaintiff from the smokers to the State. Further-
more, the State rearticulated its concerns in restitution, dropping
tort.
The adversary system, and their desire for success for their
clients, structured the State's lawyers incentives to "live" what
S.F.C. Milsom identified as "the life of the common law." 4 Milsom
wrote:
The life of the common law has been in the abuse of its
elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what
seems an unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has
74 S.F.C.MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 6(2d ed. 1981).
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proved that from the materials of obligation you can
counterfeit the phenomena of property. If the rules of
contract give what now seems an unjust answer, try tort.
Your counterfeit will look odd to one brought up on
categories of Roman origin; but it will work. If the rules
of one tort, say deceit, give what now seems an unjust
answer, try another, try negligence. And so the legal
world goes round.75
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT
The State's argument proceeds through two of what I will call
characterizations and then argues for an extension of existing
doctrine. The State's first characterization is chancery. The State's
second characterization is restitution. The State then argues for an
extension of restitution to provide for recovery. Throughout its
argument, the State insists on its anti-characterization: this is not
a products liability case.
The State's first characterization: this is a Chancery-Equity
case.76 To begin with, the State affirms a plaintiffs prerogative to
define the claims and theories of recovery." Then follows the
Chancery characterization. The State seems to have sued in
Chancery for two reasons. The first was to claim a maxim of equity.
"The first and foremost maxim of equity... is: Equity will not
suffer a wrong without a remedy.... This Honorable Court of
equity should intervene and fashion a remedy to right this wrong."7
75 Id.
" The word "equity" has several confusing and overlapping meanings. To reduce the
confusion, this Article calls the court "Chancery" not "Equity" and the decisionmaker
"Chancellor."
" Plaintiffs Memorandum Brief and Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 3-4, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Nov. 28,
1994) (No. 94-1429); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges to the
Sufficiency of the Complaint and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court at 6-
7, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges].




The State maintains it need not identify an exact precedent to
support relief.7 '9 The State's theories are "well established in
Mississippi jurisprudence," but they lack direct precedential support
because they "have not been applied heretofore to the defendants'
conduct."0 It suffices "that under the established principles of the
law of the land some relief is clearly requisite and a practical
remedy consonant with established principles of procedure may be
applied.""' The State is not asking "the court to create a new judge-
made liability out of whole cloth." 2 The court, the State argues,
ought to "recognize a suit under existing and long-established
equitable theories.""
The tobacco companies assail the State's equitable-chancery
characterization and assert that this lawsuit is not a Chancery
case.84 They plant their flag on the State's anti-characterization:
the tobacco companies' obligations to buyers "arising from the sale
of tobacco is created not by equitable considerations, but by the law
of products liability."85
The tobacco companies maintain that the State is using its
Chancery characterization to invite the court to develop a new and
easier substantive theory of recovery. 6 "[A] chancellor's subjective
sense of fairness cannot.., substitute for the established elements
of a claim."87 Further they contend that the "[P]laintiff cannot
simply invent new duties, denominate them as 'equitable,' and then
79 Id. at 75.
0 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Complaint and the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court at 7, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1429) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum].
8" Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 75, Moore (No. 94-1429).
82 Id.
83 Id.
' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 15,
Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429)
[hereinafter Defendants' Motion for Judgment].
85 Id.
' Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges to
the Sufficiency of the Complaint at 12, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch.
filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-1429) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition].
87 Id. at 1-3; Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings at 5, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996)
(No. 94-1429)[hereinafter Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment].
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seek to impose liability on defendants for breaching those duties.
He is limited to those duties that already exist under Mississippi
law."88 Believing that the court should apply the law of products
liability, the tobacco companies interpose a counter-maxim: "Equity
follows the law."89
So far we have dueling maxims: the State's "Equity will not
suffer a wrong without a remedy" stands poised against the tobacco
companies' "Equity follows the law." How do modern "Chancellors"
take equitable maxims into account when deciding disputes? The
maxims of equity resemble proverbs. Vague and often, as here,
contradictory, the maxims lend a flavor of antiquity to the argu-
ments without conveying much information about the law. Typi-
cally judges use the maxims of equity to dress up conclusions
arrived at by applying narrow rules. The reasons are apparent. Not
deduced from an overarching idea of equity as fairness, the maxims
are stated so generally that they express an attitude rather than
possess any analytical power.
Here the contradictory maxims leave the contest undecided. The
State, however, has selected a maxim congruent with the creativity
it seeks. Consistent with the State's grasp of the common law's
possibilities, its maxim expresses a theory of legal change more in
tune with what actually happens than the tobacco companies'.
The State's maxim is "Equity will not suffer a wrong without a
remedy." Although the claimant must usually find the defendant's
"wrong" in positive law before receiving a remedy, McClintock
explained the maxim carefully to leave play in the joints for courts
to accomplish the creative and adaptive expansion of law discussed
above.
Equity does not undertake to redress wrongs which are
violations of moral, as distinguished from legal, obliga-
tions, but the final test to distinguish a legal from a
moral obligation is whether it will be enforced, or at
least recognized as binding, by courts. But the maxim
does operate when there is presented to a court of equity
Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 15.
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a claim to protection against a wrong which is of a
nature similar to that which has been recognized and
protected, but for which there is no relief established by
precedent.90
Even if the tobacco companies cannot block the State's equity
characterization, nevertheless, they argue, the game ought to be
played according to the customary legal rules. Their maxim is
"Equity follows the law." The maxim of stand pat sometimes fails
to overcome the quest for creativity. "[T]he maxim that equity
follow the law," McClintock observed, "is disregarded much more
frequently than it is applied; necessarily so, since equity is a system
for the correction of the defects in the law."91
The State's version of Chancery resembles the equitable discre-
tion the New Mexico court articulated in Navajo Academy v. Navajo
United Methodist Mission School.92 This point requires a summary
and a quotation. The Academy was operating a school for Navajo
youngsters on the Mission School's property, but the relationship
deteriorated.93 After the Academy's lease of Mission School's
facilities expired and renewal negotiations failed, the Mission School
sued in magistrate's court to evict the Academy.94 The Academy
reacted with an action in district court seeking a "declaration that
it was entitled to continued occupancy of the property under a
'constructive' long-term lease."95 The district judge, although not
finding a lease, thought it "impractical" for the Academy with its
250 students to vacate the premises and granted it three years to
leave.96 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that "[g]iven the trial
court's findings and the unusual circumstances of this case, the
court did not abuse its equitable discretion as a court of equity in
90 HENRY LACEY MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOKOFTHE PRINCIPLES OFEQUITY § 29, at 77 (2d
ed. 1948).
9' Id. § 24, at 53.





9 Id. at 240.
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permitting the tenant- [Academy] to remain on the property for three
years following termination of the lease."
97
Flexible and discretionary equity provided a remedy even though
the Academy had not mounted a successful argument that a
substantive breach of property, contract, tort, restitution, or any
other right had occurred. 8 The court, constrained to justify an
equitable remedy for a litigant whose legal remedy was inadequate
because it was absent, explained: "it is anything but new for this
Court to validate an equitable solution to a problem such as the one
before us when a party asks for justice and a 'legal' remedy is
inadequate; 'equity frequently interferes.' , 99 The court also states,
"[A] court of equity has power to meet the problem presented, and
to fashion a proper remedy to accomplish a just and proper
result."100
The court continues:
Equitable remedies . . . are distinguished by their
flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to
circumstances, and the natural rules which govern their
use. There is in fact no limit to their variety and appli-
cation; the court of equity has the power of devising its
remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circum-
stances of every case and the complex relations of all the
parties.
101
The court also notes that, "In the case at bar, the trial court
devised a remedy that permits the Academy to continue functioning
as a school as it searches for a new home. ,,10 The Court
concludes that,
"' Id. at 236.
DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 229-33 (6th ed. 1999).
Navajo Academy, Inc., 785 P.2d at 240 (quoting Romero v. Mufios, 1 N.M. 314, 316
(1859)).
,o' Id. (quoting Hilburn v. Brodhead, 444 P.2d 971, 975 (N.M. 1968)).
"" Id. (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, ATREATISEONEQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 109,
at 305 (5th ed. 1941)).
,"2 Id. at 241.
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We believe that this remedy did not "exceed the bounds
of reason," since, in addition to all the other factors, the
numerous and costly improvements the Academy
bestowed upon the Mission School campus can be viewed
as the equivalent of several years' rent. We conclude
that the trial court's order permitting the Academy to
remain on the campus for a period of time not to exceed
three years from the date of the judgment was not an
abuse of discretion, and the judgment is affirmed.0 3
Quite a beautiful sentiment, but a remedy 'without a right
reverses the maxim "no right without a remedy." Under a more
rule-bound view of the court's power, however, there is "no remedy
without a wrong." Remedies, even equitable remedies, follow
breaches of substantive law-almost all the time. Unless a
defendant violated a plaintiffs rights as defined under substantive
law, a judge should not enjoin that defendant. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated in a footnote in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, °4 "under general equity principles, an injunction issues only
if there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or imminently
will violate, some provision of statutory or common law, and there
is a 'cognizable danger of recurrent violation.' "105 Similarly, the
Court forbade a trial judge from enjoining defendants who had not
violated the substantive law; the trial judge's equitable power to
enjoin "could be exercised only on the basis of a violation of the law
and could extend no farther than required by the nature and extent
of the violation."' 6 As often occurs, however, in dealing with a
chancery remedy, the court's dictum identified a safety valve: to
grant a winning plaintiff complete relief, a defendant who has not
103 Id.
'04 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
'0 Id. at 765 n.3 (1994) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633
(1953)). "Constitutional" ought to be added to "statutory or common law."
" General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982); see also
Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Mark I Mktg. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 285, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(There is no 'injunctive' cause of action under New York or federal law. Instead [a plaintif]
must allege some wrongful conduct on the part of [a defendant] for which their requested
injunction is an appropriate remedy.").
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violated the plaintiffs substantive rights may be affected by "minor
and ancillary" provisions of the injunctive order.1" 7
Perhaps the State could have persuaded the court to create a
precedent. Otherwise, unless the State could have convinced a trial
judge and probably an appellate court to follow the Navajo Academy
technique, it must find a "wrong" to pin its remedy on.
Inadequacy-Irreparability: In traditional terms, before Chancery
will grant a plaintiffs request for an injunction or any other
"equitable" remedy, the plaintiff must show its "legal" remedy to be
inadequate. In other words, unless a plaintiff receives an equitable
remedy, he will encounter irreparable injury. Accepting for the
purpose of discussing this issue the idea that the State's request for
restitution is equitable, I turn to the issue of whether the State's
legal remedy was "inadequate."
First, what was the State's legal remedy? The Mississippi
Medicaid statute has an assignment-subrogation provision.' The
assignment-subrogation principle is straightforward: If a Tortfeasor
injures a Citizen and if the State Medicaid program pays to patch
Citizen up, then the State is substituted for Citizen to recover the
portion of Citizen's tort cause of action against Tortfeasor paid by
Medicaid. The Mississippi statute calls the State's assumption of
Citizen's claim against Tortfeasor an "assignment."'0 9
The State's "legal" remedy is for Medicaid to pay the smoker-
victim's medical bills and for the State to subrogate to each of the
victims' "assigned" claims against the tobacco companies. The
State's legal remedy, assignment-subrogation, is inadequate, the
State maintained, because it is expensive, complex, and burdensome
on judicial resources. In short, it will require a multiplicity of
actions at law."0 Second, the Medicaid assignment-subrogation
solution does not apply to the State's payments through its own
' General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 399.
'c" MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-13-305 (1998).
"J Id. The reason for the "assignment" label is to avoid the collateral source rule, which,
unless altered, would let Citizen recover full medical damages from Tortfeasor after Medicaid
pays him. If Citizen "assigns! the claim to the State, that will prevent Citizen's double
recovery.
"' Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 2, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Dec. 9, 1994); Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 18, Moore ex rel. State
v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
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indigent care programs or for insurance claims of State
employees.'11 Finally, the State statutes give the State the ability
to sue: "The state shall be entitled to bring all actions and [seek] all
remedies to which individuals are entitled ... .""
The tobacco companies argue against the State's Chancery
characterization by contending that the State's "legal" remedy is
adequate.' The State's legal remedy of assignment-subrogation,
however, exists under the Medicaid statutes1 4 where the State
cannot recover from tobacco companies unless the smokers could
have recovered from the tobacco companies. The statutes require
Medicaid recipients to assign their rights against third party-
tortfeasors to the Medicaid payor. The State is then subrogated to
the smokers' rights against the tobacco companies; the State-
subrogee takes the smokers' claim with its substantive elements and
defenses. The State which provided medical benefits to infirm
smokers now seeks to recover the cost from the tobacco companies.
But the State has not shown the smokers have any right to recover
from the tobacco companies. The State thinks assignment-
subrogation is "inadequate" because of the absence of the tobacco
companies' liability to smokers; judges and juries have rejected
smokers' products liability claims.1 5 The State's solution of
subrogation-assignment, however, is exclusive. The State's
Medicaid subrogation is to a smoker's products liability case; it is
not a restitution-indemnity case. The law of restitution-indemnity
will not stretch far enough to include the State's claims.
An argument that plaintiffs remedy at law is inadequate because
it would require a multiplicity of suits arises when the plaintiff has
a successful substantive claim and the choice is between two
possible remedies, a legal one, typically money damages, and an
equitable one, typically an injunction. A plaintiff who is suffering
a substantive injury which damages will not restore argues in
... Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 15-16, Moore (No. 94-1429).
112 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-45-11 (1998).
"' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 12, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-
1429).
114 Id. at 6.
15 Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 10, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-1429).
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support of an injunction that although her repeated suits for small
amounts of damages will not deter the defendant, her cost of
litigation will consume her resources. Her legal remedy would be
successful, but ultimately ineffectual. The plaintiffs legal remedy,
therefore, exists, but it is inadequate because it will require a
multiplicity of lawsuits.
The State of Mississippi argued that its legal remedy is inade-
quate although as plaintiff it would probably lack a successful
substantive claim because the tobacco companies had not been
shown to be liable to the smokers who received Medicaid.' 16 The
State argues its nonexistent legal remedy is inadequate.
An Iowa precedent supports the tobacco companies' contention.
In the State of Iowa's lawsuit to recover Medicaid payments from
the tobacco companies under common law indemnity, the Iowa
Supreme Court accepted the argument that the state's recovery
statute was "the State's exclusive remedy to recoup Medicaid
costs.""' 7  Furthermore, the court stated that "[a]lthough the
statutory provisions to enforce the remedy may be impractical, it is
the only remedy provided.""'
There are differences between the Iowa and Mississippi cases.
The Iowa statute grants the State a lien instead of providing for an
assignment; the tobacco companies cited the Iowa statute as a
defense to indemnity and not to show the State's remedy at law was
inadequate; and the state of Iowa lacked a common law right to
recover Medicaid payments from third parties. The Iowa decision
failed to address the State's own insurance payments and independ-
ent indigent care programs. Nevertheless, the Iowa court's basic
holding, although not binding precedent, would have supported a
Mississippi courts decision to limit the state government to the
statutory remedy for Medicaid recovery.
So far the State seemed to lead. The tobacco companies' petrified
approach to common law change is inconsistent with the Mississippi
Supreme Court's and the leading commentators' approaches. The
"" See DOUGLAS LAYcOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 73-75 (1991)
(discussing when legal remedies are inadequate solutions).
"1 Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Iowa 1998).
s Id. at 406.
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State's maxim expresses an aspiration for a better society instead
of a defensive resistance to change. The tobacco companies'
argument that the State has an adequate remedy at law has more
support, but whether the law-equity issue is really tilting with
windmills will emerge below.
VI. STATE: THIS IS A RESTITUTION CASE
The State's second characterization is: this Chancery case is a
restitution-indemnity case. The State's anti-characterization
persists: this is not a products liability tort case.
A plaintiff will endeavor to recover restitution to prevent or
reverse the defendant's unjust enrichment. Tort-products liability
and restitution are discrete areas of substantive law almost always
with differing remedies. The law of torts-products liability branch
-defines when a manufacturer or seller is liable for harm a product
inflicts; it measures what a defendant pays by what it takes to
compensate injured plaintiffs. Restitution defines a defendant's
liability to repay a benefit it received unjustly; it measures what a
defendant pays by the defendant's unjust enrichment.
Restitution is a branch of legal liability separate and distinct
from tort and contract. Defendant's tort liability is not a prerequi-
site for restitution."9 The State's restitution-indemnity theory is
not grounded on the tobacco companies' fault. Courts order
restitution to prevent defendants' unjust enrichment; a plaintiff
often recovers restitution to prevent or reverse defendant's unjust
enrichment with no other substantive breach.
This, the tobacco companies argue, is not a restitution case. The
State's "highly imaginative complaint" 2 ' is based on "an entirely
new theory."'' This is a tort case, a product liability case for
..9 Plaintiffs Memorandum Brief and Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 2-3, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Nov. 28,
1994) (No. 94-1429); Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 6-7, Moore ex rel. State v.
American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
"2 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, Moore ex rel. State v.
American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
. Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 1, Moore (No. 94-1429).
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damages."' It is a products liability case because "plaintiff seeks to
recover for injuries caused by a product.""12
The tobacco companies argue that the consequences of accepting
the State's restitution characterization would be inauspicious." 4
They make several points. First, the State cannot recover restitu-
tion as that subject is defined; accepting the State's ideas of
restitution would rewrite and distort the doctrine of restitution-
indemnity.'25 This issue will be developed below. Second, the State
bases its restitution-indemnity recovery on its payment of the
tobacco companies' obligation to the smokers. 126 But the tobacco
companies' obligation to the smokers has not been established. The
State has not shown any tobacco companies' legal liability.
1 7
Products liability, the State's anti-characterization, is the tobacco
companies' characterization. That doctrine represents the struggle
of courts and legislatures to balance the competing interests of
consumers and manufacturers. 2 s The State's restitution character-
ization would absorb all of the balanced law of products liability. It
would impose damages on the tobacco companies although they
have consistently prevailed in products liability lawsuits. It would
be extended to create similar liability for other risky but
nondefective products.
Furthermore, the tobacco companies assert, this is a products
liability case with subrogation. The State is subrogated to each
smoker's "assigned" products liability cause of action against the
tobacco companies. The State must prove the elements of each
smokers' products liability tort and refute any affirmative defenses.
The tobacco companies adduce a "flood of litigation" argument.
If the State's restitution-indemnity theories succeed against the
" Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 1-5, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-
1429).
'" Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 5, Moore (No. 94-1429).
124 Id. at 5_10.
12 Id.
6 Id.
327 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 1, Moore (No. 94-1429).
'2 Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 5, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss Ch. Filed Nov. 28, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
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tobacco companies, plaintiffs will seek restitution-indemnity for
asbestos, alcohol, and automobiles.'29 The State, finally, must take
its contentions to the legislature-for only the legislature "creates"
law. Legislatures are better than courts at making policy and fiscal
decisions. 3 '
VII. CHARACTERIZATION: THE JUDGE'S ROLE
The tobacco companies argued for a products liability character-
ization because products liability is the playing field on which they
are accustomed to winning. The State argued for restitution
because the alternative is worse. It preferred a chance of success
over the likelihood of failure. So the State's explicit Chancery-
restitution characterizations contain their implicit anti-character-
ization: this is not a products liability case. What are the State's
Chancery and restitution characterizations' prospects? How likely
was it for the court to have accepted them?
Many of the writers who discuss characterization, particularly
those who study choice of law, view characterization as a symptom
of a sick and incoherent system of choice of law.'3 ' They object to
characterization because it is a judicial escape device via intellectual
dishonesty from a stupid result based on the discredited vested
rights system.'32 They perceive characterization as a court decision
to assign a dispute to a legal category made intuitively without
articulating principled reasons. 3
In a dispute with attributes of two common law categories which,
to be decided, must be assigned to one, how does the judge ascertain
the "correct" category? The categories do not define themselves.
' Id. at 4; see Robert Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule ofLaw,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601, 648 (1998) ("What comes next-coffee, soft drinks, red meat, dairy
products, sugar, fast foods, automobiles, sporting goods?'). These arguments missed the
product that would follow tobacco-guns.
," Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 4, 17, Moore (No. 94-1429); Reply Memorandum
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 19, Moore (No. 94-1429).
"' ROGER CRAMPTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 43-48 (5th ed. 1993).
13 Id.
" Id.; see Earl Maltz, The Full Fourth and Credit Clause and the First Restatement:
The Place of Baker v. General Motors Corp. in Choice of Law Theory, 73 TUL. L. REV. 305,
318-19 (1998) (summarizing critics of characterization).
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Several pitfalls and faulty characterizations techniques await the
unwary. First, the court may state a characterization as a
conclusion without articulating reasons.14 The court may buttress
its conclusion by emphasizing the aspects of the dispute which
support the favored characterization.13 5  In another technique
resembling "contact counting," the court will identify and list similar
and dissimilar features and total each list.3 ' A third technique is
to overlook the idea that legal words have different meanings in
different contexts and to recycle a classification from another
context, for example to recycle a domestic law characterization for
choice of law purposes.13 ' There are better ways. A rehabilitated
characterization will emerge below.
Professor Schauer, in one of the leading books on courts' tech-
niques with common law rules, suggests a metaphor of "local" and
"distant" rules 1'3 for making the decisions I have called characteriza-
tion. The court, he writes, should favor the more "local" rule.'39
"The rule that is less general, and more applicable to a smaller
number of events, seems t9 be more applicable to. the events to
which it does apply."40 But this is not always the case. While "at
least presumptive priority is commonly granted to the most locally
applicable rule,"""' local priority is not absolute, for otherwise courts
would base few decisions on general and "distant" principles like
unjust enrichment and equal protection of the law. A court,
Professor Schauer says, may select "the more distant rule" for, just
as a court can prefer a rule's justification instead of the rule itself,
a court may also favor justifications from other parts of the system
"3 See Levy v. Steiger, 124 N.E. 477, 477 (Mass. 1919) (characterizing case as falling
under tort law of Massachusetts).
" See Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 95 N.W.2d 814,818 (Wis. 1959) (setting
forth concerns supporting family characterization).
"" See Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961) (comparing "weight and significance"
of contacts of different states in determining which law to apply).
", See Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164-65 (Conn. 1928)
(allowing plaintiff injured in Massachusetts to sue under Connecticut law); Cutts v.
Najdrowski, 198 A. 885, 886 (N.J. 1938) (applying law of state where transaction occurs to
govern validity of trust).
" SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 189.
1v, Id.
4' Id.
,4' Id. at 191.
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over a rule.142 This simultaneously increases the courts' ability to
decide disputes correctly and reduces rules' stability and predictabil-
ity.1
43
Is the "traditional" law of products liability, in Professor
Schauer's terms, "local"? If so, should the justification from the
more "distant" category of restitution overcome the presumption for
local rules? If, as seems likely, products liability is "local" for
tobacco, then the State's restitution characterization initially
encounters the "presumptive priority" of products liability.
Even though Professor Schauer's positivism is presumptive and
subject to being surmounted in an appropriate dispute, many courts
would not accept as much abrupt change as the State suggests. If
the court was wooden and literal in following presumptive positiv-
ism, then it might find the State's suggestions too sweeping and, as
the tobacco companies suggest, remand the controversy to the
legislature. Although Schauer's metaphors of local and distant rules
may militate against a decision that the State's Medicaid recovery
lawsuit falls within restitution, they do not assure that result; the
court could conclude that the State's arguments for unjust enrich-
ment leading to restitution overcome the presumption.
If the court was to depend on Professor Eisenberg's generative
approach, common law rules might be somewhat less certain. A
court, he maintains, should decide disputes by applying the
institutional principles of adjudication. 144 These principles promote
substantial stability in common law rules. They require a court to
apply existing social standards, not what the individual judges think
the rule ought to be. People have a right to turn to courts to resolve
past disputes based on established and existing claims of duty.
Courts should base decisions on those duties, not on what the judges
think is best at the time. A legislator, in contrast, may establish by
statute the "best" rule drawn from the moral and legal views he
holds.
142 Id. at 188-91.
143 Id.
144 EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 3.
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Common law courts should, Professor Eisenberg says, look to
three goals. 45 First, the doctrine should be consistent with social
propositions and goals--social congruence.' 46 Second, it should be
consistent internally-systemic congruency. 147 Third, it should be
satisfactorily stable.'48
Although Professor Eisenberg does not discuss characterization
by name, his helpful discussion takes up related techniques to effect
change like overruling, distinguishing, and creating exceptions.
49
"Objective" signals that a rule or practice is ripe for overruling are
jaggedness, incoherent exceptions, and "significant criticism in the
professional literature."'5 °  Treatises, law reviews, as well as
statutes and decisions from other jurisdictions will tell a court that
a doctrine has garnered significant professional criticism and lacks
"social congruence or systemic consistency."''
Characterization begins with two principles, each with a sphere
of application, which point to different results where the spheres
overlap. Litigants ask the court to characterize, to decide which
principle governs, and to articulate a new rule to reflect both old
principles. Courts, Professor Eisenberg maintains, "determine what
kinds of transactions are sufficiently special, under applicable social
propositions, to justify their exemption from the full force of an
otherwise relevant principle."'52 Courts develop the common law "by
hiving off certain types of activity from treatment under an
established rule, in a manner that is consistent with the social
propositions that support the rule.""' "Major gains in social
congruence and systemic consistency outweigh losses in the stability
of doctrine over time."
154
For tobacco, the conditions for a new legal regime may be
satisfied. The question is the form it will take. Critics in profes-
" Id. at 50.
'" Id. at 44.
147 Id.
'4 Id. at 4.
's Id. at 104-140.
"'a Id. at 118
' Id. at 119.
15, Id. at 83.
" Id. at 68.
' Id. at 71.
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sional literature argue that the paradigm "tobacco companies win"
lacks social congruence, because it is contrary to policy and lacks
systemic consistency, and because it is inconsistent with related
rules.
Jagged change occurs when a court distinguishes or creates
plausible exceptions which may really be inconsistent or impossible
to administer, leading to anomalies as well as to "disintegration and
decay." Courts formulate and establish new rules to explain
anomalies and to articulate doctrine consistent with policy.
155
Tobacco's current legal jaggedness is expressed in the recent
products liability Restatement and the articles attacking it. Tobacco
companies' liability came up repeatedly in the recent products
liability Restatement. A tentative draft observed, "Several courts
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly
unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of
danger, that liability should attach even absent proof of a reason-
able alternative design."156 Called "product category defectiveness,"
this form of liability would usually constitute a judicial decision that
the product "should be removed from the market rather than be
redesigned."'57 Discussing tobacco, in addition to alcohol, guns, and
above-ground swimming pools, the Restatement reporters' tentative
draft commentary observed, however, that
courts have not imposed liability for categories of
products that are generally available and widely used
and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of
harm. Instead, courts have concluded that legislatures
and administrative agencies can, more appropriately
than courts, consider the desirability of commercial
distribution of some categories of widely used and
consumed, but nevertheless dangerous, products.'58
'5 Id. at 79-80.
"5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Proposed Final
Draft 1997).
,5 Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987).




A vote on an amendment at the ALI Annual Meeting session in 1997
deleted tobacco from the list,'59 leaving it possible for a creative
lawyer to point to tobacco as defective even though there is no
reasonable alternative design. 60
Accepting the State's restitution characterization may also
resemble what Professor Eisenberg names "transformation."' 6' The
court, without admitting an earlier error, departs from it and rejects
an established rule without announcing what it has done.'62 The
transforming court maintains "the impression that the standard of
doctrinal stability is an extremely powerful constraint on judicial
decisionmaking."' 63 This pretext, however, is disingenuous, opaque,
and sends mixed signals.
Expanding a category like restitution to encompass subjects
formerly not included in its ambit often involves explicitly or
implicitly overruling older, more narrow rules. Overruling promotes
coherent future decisions. The overruling court says, in effect, the
earlier decisions were wrong, the old way is discredited, and we are
substituting a new rule. Most trial judges and lawyers catch on
right away or promptly. Transformation, Professor Eisenberg
insists, is rarely preferable to overruling because the "transforming"
court, in the service of bringing the law into line with social
aspirations, neglects reasoned articulation.'6 4
Professor Eisenberg outlines other judicial techniques courts
employ to change the common law. A court may limit unwelcome
precedent with "inconsistent distinctions" and "overriding."'65 An
inconsistent distinction occurs when the court distinguishes or
creates an exception, but in light of the rule and the policy, the
distinction or exception is incongruous as it leaves some cases under
the sway of the rule.166  Perhaps the original rule and the
'' Frank Vandall, The American Law Institute is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRAL. REV.
801, 805 (1998).
" The final vers ion is RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt.
d (1998).
161 EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 56.
'62 Id. at 132.
163 Id. at 134.
164 id.
'65 Id. at 135'66 Id. at 136.
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distinction-exception cannot be administered coherently. Courts
also limit precedent by "overriding."1 7 The court deals with an issue
within the precedent's stated rule but in a dispute where policy does
not support the application of the rule, and the court does not apply
the precedent. Overriding is something between implied overruling
and distinguishing.16 Either of these techniques is available to a
court to uphold the State's characterizations. The State, a court
might hold, for example, could sue the tobacco companies in
chancery for restitution even though a private litigant is limited to
the products liability tort for damages.
The court may characterize with what I call the purpose tech-
nique. The court would examine the purposes of the competing
categories, the justifications for the rules in conflict, and the moral,
economic, and administrative factors that bear on the decision.
Then it would determine how each classification will advance and
retard those purposes, justifications, and factors. The final stage is
for the decisionmaker, informed by the foregoing inquiry, to exercise
professional judgment.
The "purpose" method of characterization is debatable at every
stage and missteps occur. For example, one court, reaching for a
"contract" characterization of a vicarious liability statute, said the
statute's purpose was not the tort purpose of victims' compensation
but another purpose, encouraging highway safety.'69 The legisla-
ture, it is likely, had considered both compensation and deterrence
when passing the statute, even if it is possible to accept encouraging
safety as a contract purpose. Although the purpose method may not
always lead the court to a "correct" result, it has the virtue of
focusing the judges' critical professional judgment on the important
issues, which rule, policy, and interest to prefer and which to
subordinate.
How likely would it have been for a court to accept the character-
ization of the State's Medicaid recovery action as restitution? A
novel characterization, this is A, not B, is less apparently disruptive
- Id. at 135.
' Id. at 136.
Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164 (Conn. 1928).
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than overruling; but, it may change the precedent system in ways
that are difficult to predict.
The State characterizes as Chancery and as restitution to achieve
the benefits of the new regime and to avoid the drawbacks of the old
regime. The tobacco companies' position of opposition to common
law change generally is contrary to centuries of the common law
process, the Mississippi Supreme Court's statements, and the wise
commentators, Professor Schauer and Professor Eisenberg.
Could a court refuse to accept the State's particular characteriza-
tions? Yes. Characterization has pitfalls and maladies which
perceptive judges may seek to avoid. The court could choose from
several pegs to hang a decision for the tobacco company on: we
prefer stability to change this time. This is not a Chancery case. If
it is, the State's remedy at law is adequate. This is a products
liability tort, not a restitution, case. This observer cannot be sure
a court would have accepted the State's Chancery-restitution
characterizations.
Finally, the "tobacco companies win' paradigm is unlike the
court-made rules of common law that Professors Schauer and
Eisenberg examine. Tobacco companies have developed the
paradigm by convincing juries, not appellate courts. Recent events
may have altered jurors' readiness to accept the companies'
arguments that the smokers knew of the risks and assumed them.
In early 1999, a San Francisco jury returned a verdict for $1.5
million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive
damages in favor of a former smoker with lung cancer.' The third
jury verdict for a typical smoker and the second for punitive
damages, this one may be the first to survive post-verdict judicial
review.' The next month, an Oregon jury award $81,000,000,
including $79,500,000 in punitive damages, to the family of a lung
cancer victim. 2 These two verdicts may be analogous to what
1' John Schwartz, Jury Awards Ex-Smoker $51.5 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999,
at A3.
171 Id.




Professor Eisenberg calls an inconsistent exception, 173 a decision or
line of decisions inconsistent with parallel lines of decisions and,
since the two juries rejected the defense that smokers bear the
responsibility for their choice to smoke, a harbinger of lawsuits and
tort verdicts for smokers yet to come.
VIII. STATE: OUR RESTITUTION CLAIM WILL SUCCEED
The State's first two stages were explicit characterizations, this
is (1) a Chancery case and (2) a restitution case, plus its implicit
anti-characterization that it is not a products liability case.
Although major hurdles for the State, chancery-restitution charac-
terizations do not spell success. The State's next proposition was
not a characterization, but an argument to extend or expand
liability under existing law: the tobacco companies are liable under
restitution principles for the State's tobacco-related Medicaid
payments.
"Plaintiff," the tobacco companies protested, "apparently believes
that the more confusing he makes the law of restitution and
indemnity appear, the higher his likelihood of success." 174 One
litigant's confusion is another's creativity. For as Professor Milsom
reminded us, "it is only by confusing the issues that legal develop-
ment becomes possible." 75
Many find restitution confusing. "Restitution" warned Professor
Dobbs, "is a simple word but a difficult subject."'76 Unjust
enrichment-restitution is a discrete source of liability or obligation
like contract or tort. As Professor Kull put it in his preliminary
draft for the Third Restatement of Restitution, restitution "is a
coordinate basis of liability that, taken together with principles of
contract and torts, completes the account of civil obligations in our
legal system."'
177
173 See EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 138-139 (When a court draws an inconsistent
distinction there are two inconsistent legal standards on the books at the same time-the
underlying rule and the inconsistent exception.").
"7 Defendants' Motion in Opposition at 19, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-1429).
175 MILSOM, supra note 74, at 335.
176 1 DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 551 (2d ed. 1993).
'7' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 1 1998).
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Restitution originated in England separately on the law side in
general assumpsit plus the common counts and on the equity-
chancery side in the constructive trust. The first Restatement of
Restitution in 1937 identified defendant's unjust enrichment as a
freestanding substantive basis for plaintiff to recover restitution,
and it expressed its unified insight in its section 1, which became
the State's first restitution theory: "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
to the other."" 8
The State's argument runs as follows. Pursuant to its duty to
assuage the plight of its infirm citizens, the State has established
Medicaid to pay their medical costs, many of them caused by
smoking. The tobacco companies created many of these medical
costs by selling their addictive and harmful product to smokers. The
costs "rightfully should have been borne by the tobacco compa-
nies."
179
The State, in other words, asked the court to base restitution-
indemnity on State Medicaid payments to Infirm Citizen of an
amount for which the tobacco companies have not been held liable
to Infirm Citizen, but for which the tobacco companies ought to be
liable to Infirm Citizen. The State may recover restitution from
tobacco companies because the tobacco companies are unjustly
enriched when the product they sell causes medical expenses that
they are not paying. The amount the tobacco companies are
unjustly enriched is the amount they "save" by not paying for the
medical expenses tobacco causes. The amount the State should
recover is the amount it pays to deal with the insalubrious conse-
quences of tobacco.
Section 1 of the first Restatement expresses an open-textured
approach to restitution. Defendant's unjust enrichment is a broad
standard ofjustice. The principle is attractive because it is versatile
and adaptable to new situations.
That a set of fixed rules cannot resolve all disputes is the lesson
of the common law. Courts must, on occasion, refer to first princi-
'" RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
171 Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Chalenges at 40, Moore ex reL. State v. American Tobacco
Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994 (No. 94-1429).
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ples. "The law of restitution is characterized by a heavy dependence
on general principles.""18
There are two functional types of restitution: freestanding
restitution and restitution as an alternative remedy in tort, contract
or property. 181 Not involved here is the latter, restitution as an
alternate remedy for a breach of contract or tort. The absence of
tobacco company product liability or tort liability is the reason the
State sought restitution.
Freestanding restitution, the subject here, occurs where plaintiff
can show no other ground of substantive liability, except that the
defendant was unjustly enriched. Plaintiff claims defendant has
been unjustly enriched and asks restitution, recovery measured by
the defendant's unjust enrichment. It might be more accurate to
describe freestanding restitution as follows: the substantive law is
unjust enrichment and the remedy is restitution.
When a plaintiff asks for freestanding restitution, although he or
she would not prevail in tort, the court must ask a difficult question:
If the court finds defendant unjustly enriched and grants plaintiff
restitution, would that undermine the reason to deny tort recovery?
This Article will develop two approaches to freestanding restitution,
broad and narrow. Broad freestanding restitution began in the late
eighteenth century when Lord Mansfield let restitution's genie out
of the bottle in Moses v. Macferlan.8 2 "If the defendant be under an
obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund, the law implies
a debt and gives this action, founded in the equity of the plaintiffs
case, as it were upon a contract (quasi ex contractu, as the Roman
law expresses it)."" 3 Lord Mansfield, Professor Baker explained,
freed the principle of unjust enrichment from procedural technical-
ity. 1
84
180 DOBBS, supra note 176, at 551.
1"' Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1276,
1277 (1989).
182 Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (KB. 1760).
's Id. at 1012. The Preliminary Draft for the Restatement Third of Restitution relies on
a slightly different statement. "IThe gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money." Id.
184 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 424 (1990).
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But just as the relationship between substantive principle and
procedure will never be settled definitively, so also within substan-
tive principle, "the discussion about the relative importance in a
legal system of certainty and abstract justice is unending."185 We
turn to the tension between, on the one hand, the principle of
freestanding unjust enrichment as a "broad" or independent ground
for restitution and, on the other, "narrow" restitution bounded by
rules.
Aristotle's explanation of "equity," from the Nichomachaen
Ethics, underlies the spirit of broad freestanding restitution.8 6 A
court employs a sense of "equity" to correct "law where law is
defective because of its generality."'87
When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and
thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule,
it is then right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement
because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to
rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would
himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and
would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case
in question. '88
Although Aristotle's translator's nontechnical use of the word
"equity" differs from the technical sense of distinguishing the courts
of common law from courts of chancery, its roots are also in the dual
system of common law courts and chancery. In contrast to the
professional perception that common law courts applied fixed rules
to facts, chancellors are thought to have adjudicated disputes with
flexibility, emphasizing context. So the unending debate between
certain rules and individualized justice "was at once institutional-
ized; certainty resided in the common law courts, justice in the
chancellor's equity."'8 s Even after the courts of the common law and
, MILSOM, supra note 74, at 94.




18" MILSOM, supra note 74, at 94.
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chancery were merged, many observers continue to associate equity
in Aristotle's discretion-dispensation sense with equity in the
chancery sense. This association may account for the State's quest
for a Chancery characterization where it hopes a Chancellor will
observe a wrong in search of a remedy and dispense with the
technical rules which have prevented smokers from recovering from
tobacco companies.
Broad Restitution: Courts and commentators have articulated
the Restatement section l's independent unjust enrichment as a
basis for restitution. Restitution, the Utah Supreme Court said, is
"equitable relief."9 ' "Courts have broad authority to grant equitable
relief as needed."191 The Supreme Court, discussing the scope of its
appellate review, observed:
[Tihe facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are
often complex and vary greatly from case to case.
Indeed, by its very nature, the unjust enrichment
doctrine developed to handle fact situations that did not
fit within a particular legal standard but which nonethe-
less merited judicial intervention . . . . The court's
ability to state clearly the outcome-determinative factors
remains elusive .... Unjust enrichment law developed
to remedy injustice when other areas of the law could
not. Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible and
workable doctrine.
1 9 2
Courts have used broad freestanding unjust enrichment as a
statement of positive law and a guide to decisions.' The Virginia
decision in Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, where the court,
admittedly without supporting precedent, but because "natural
justice plainly requires," allowed restitution for defendant's over-use
of an easement, is a notable unjust enrichment decision, particularly
'90 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998).
1-1 Id. at 1243.
"9 Id. at 1244-45.
"9' Kistler v. Stoddard, 688 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. App. 1985) (validating lower court's use of




because that court is known more for its dogged conservativism than
for its willingness to innovate.'" Professor George Palmer writes:
Unjust enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same
way that justice is indefinable. But many of the mean-
ings of justice are derived from a sense of injustice.
[Professor Palmer cites E. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice
here.] This is true of restitution since attention is
centered on the prevention of injustice. Not all injustice
but rather one special variety: the unjust enrichment of
one person at the expense of another. This wide and
imprecise idea has played a creative role in the develop-
ment of an important branch of modern law.'95
Broad restitution based on freestanding unjust enrichment as a
default for courts to employ when other principles fail has both
virtues and vices, for as then-Professor Sullivan reminded us, "The
perception of what is just is by no means an objective vision and
varies from generation to generation, from case to case, and from
court to court.'' 9 ' It "has presented extraordinary difficulties to
those who have sought to systematize and reconcile the distinctly
unsystematic and conflicting cases."" 7
Imprecision in the pursuit of justice is, in this view, a virtue.
"Unjust enrichment," Professor Dobbs said, "cannot be precisely
defined, and for that very reason has potential for resolving new
problems in striking ways."'9 8 Law, at this level of abstraction, is a
question-asking process. We can expect legal rules or standards like
section 1 unjust enrichment to focus the decisionmaker's judgment
on the critical issues, not to compel predictable results. If a court
were to accept a broad, or section 1, view of unjust enrichment and
" Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946).
1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1 (1978).
' Timothy J. Sullivan, The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-Contract, 64 GEO. L.J.
1, 26 (1975).
1' Id.




freestanding restitution and perhaps stretch it, then the State's
Medicaid restitution might have prevailed.
Narrow Restitution: But as the quotation from Professor Timothy
Sullivan's article hinted, many courts and scholars, uncomfortable
with the broad view of restitution, seek principles of containment.
The reasons for professional discomfort are palpable. Positivistic
people seek more precision in determining what type and level of
unconscientious conduct will create legal liability. From the words
"unjust enrichment," a lawyer cannot determine what standard a
court will apply to conduct. "Unjust enrichment" may be open-
ended, lacking in principle, and conclusory; "natural justice" and
"equity" cannot explain what is meant by "unjust enrichment."
Which transfers to a defendant will constitute enrichment? What
qualities of benefit will create unjustness? Answers to these
questions are delayed. Principles of confinement are lacking.
The author's experience in teaching the decisions cited above 99
in law school classrooms bears out the preceding remarks. The
decisions were selected for the casebook and the classroom because
they are difficult and lead to class discussion and differences of
opinion. Many law students, certainly at conservative Washington
& Lee, become uncomfortable with broad and capacious restitution.
After the initial sense that the decisions are "fair" wears off or is
worn down by their instructor's skeptical questioning, many law
students decide that unjust enrichment as a broad principle of
freestanding restitution may lead a court to indeterminacy,
confusion, complex disputes, erroneous application, reduced
deterrent effect, and unpredictability. Where the defendant will
escape liability or damages under contract, property, or tort
doctrines, many students conclude that granting plaintiff restitution
based solely on defendant's "unjust enrichment" will erode the
related contract, property, or tort doctrines too seriously to counte-
nance. The classroom experience leads the author to expect the
same perplexity and differing opinions in professional circles and on
collegial courts.
' Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 39 S.E.2d at 231; Kistler v. Stoddard, 688 S.W.2d 746 (Ark.
App. 1985); Kossian v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
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Professor Kull's introduction to the new restitution Restatement
stated this uncertainty articulately. "Unless a definition of
restitution can provide a more informative generalization about the
nature of the transactions leading to liability," he wrote, "it is
difficult to refute the objection that sees in 'unjust enrichment'
either an open-ended and potentially unprincipled charter of
liability or, what may be worse, a conclusion masquerading as
analysis, employed to justify a liability its proponents are unwilling
or unable to explain."2 0 Restitution, says Kull, "is narrower, more
predictable, and more objectively determined than the implications
of the words 'unjust enrichment' might lead us to suppose."20 1 The
reason is "the justification in question is not moral but legal."20 2
Unjust or unjustified enrichment identifies "the circumstances in
which the law imposes a liability in restitution." °3
Professor Birks's influential work on restitution in the United
Kingdom appears to take a similar view. The "unjust" part of unjust
enrichment means, according to Birks, that the defendant was
benefitted "in circumstances in which the law provides for restitu-
tion."2 04
The narrow view of restitution is easy to criticize as static,
external, and positivistic: static because it looks to the past for
precedent, external because it looks outside the particular dispute
for standards, and positivistic because it is based on positive law, a
legal system of fixed rules. In other words, the plaintiff ought to
locate a specific precedent to support restitution recovery. When
patterns of events recur, consistent applications of generalizations
develop corollaries or a system of precedent.
2 5
A court uncomfortable with expansive statements basing
restitution on unjust enrichment without any more precise confine-
ment might subscribe to an approach to restitution which requires
a plaintiff to locate a specific precedent or principle. If so, the
oo RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION §§ 1-4 to 1-5 (Preliminary Draft No. 1 1998).
201 Id. § 1-5.
2D2 Id.
203 Id. §1-7.
2a PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REsTITUTION 19(1989).
20' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1 1983)
(stating that repeated, consistent application of unjust enrichment results in its further
application in the cases).
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State's request for restitution of its Medicare payments to ailing
smokers would lose.
IX. THE PARTIES' RESTITUTION ARGUMENTS: EVALUATION
Does the State make acceptance of its argument for broad
freestanding restitution easier by showing a mastery of the subject
and the sources to establish its credibility? In other words, if this
were a tenure evaluation of the hypothetical law professor's
restitution articles instead of a discussion of the State's restitution
theory and the tobacco companies' response, several of the following
points would come up.
Dobbs's Disclaimer: "The terminology of restitution is abstruse
and confusing and is no matter for amateurs."2 °6
Restitution is becoming a lost art, observes Professor Kull:
"Confusion over the content of restitution carries significant adverse
consequences. To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges
and law professors included) do not know what restitution is ....
The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward
restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers
sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments of the doctrine even when
they know where to find it."
201
If restitution is a lost art, the State's legal researchers did not
look far to find it. The State's documents do not reveal in-depth
research in standard restitution sources. The State did not cite the
late Professor George Palmer's four-volume treatise, Law of
Restitution, published in 1978 and later supplemented; the restitu-
tion chapter, Chapter 4, of Professor Dan Dobbs's 1993 three-volume
treatise, Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution; or the two
tentative drafts for the proposed second Restatement of Restitution,
published in 1983 and 1984.
The State does cite the 1956 edition of Harper and James's torts
treatise, which is now in a 1986 second edition.0 8 Moreover, it also
20 DOBBS, supra note 176, at 556.
'o Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995).
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges atxii, Moore exrel. State v. American Tobacco
Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
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cites the 1973 first edition of Dobbs's Remedies treatise, which now
exists as a 1993, three-volume second edition.' 9 Furthermore, the
State cites Dobbs's treatise, not from the original but from a
quotation in a 1989 law school casebook by Robert Thompson and
John Sebert, Remedies (Second edition 1989).21 Citing an earlier or
superseded edition undermines the credibility of research and
scholarship.
The State's analysis reflects the research base. One example is
the use of the word "damages." Plaintiffs complaint seeks "damages
in an amount which is sufficient to provide restitution and re-pay
the State for the sums the State has expended on account of the
defendants' wrongful conduct."
2 '
In the technical language of remedies, "damages" means money
a claimant recovers to compensate loss, while "restitution" means
claimant's recovery, taken from the defendant to prevent its unjust
enrichment. Damages sufficient to provide restitution is technically
an oxymoron because courts measure "damages" to compensate
plaintiffs and "restitution" to strip defendants of unjust enrichment.
Because the restitution the State sought had an "indemnity" quality,
the amount necessary to compensate the State was nearly identical
to the amount the defendants were unjustly enriched. The tobacco
companies who refer to "the measure of damages in a restitution
case" apparently do not understand restitution's technical language
any better.212 The parties' error may stem from courts, probably
using the word "damages" nontechnically to describe all money
recovery, which refer to money recovery for restitution as "dam-
ages. 213
The State's research and technical analysis reflect shallow
understanding of the basics. Let us examine the State's Chancery
20 Id.
210 Id.
211 Complaint at 33-35, Moore exrel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed May
23, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
22 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 3 n.2, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-
1429).
43j See United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978) (using
"damages" to refer to money recovery under legal and equitable remedies); Estate of Johnson
v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922 (Miss. 1987) (using "damages" to refer to all recovery).
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or "Equity" characterization in light of its request for restitution.
Litigants, in general, are entitled to a jury trial in legal or common
law matters, but not in equitable or chancery matters. Usually the
plaintiff or claimant seeks a jury because of the "deep pocket" effect
-juries are considered to be sympathetic to victims and generous
with large corporations' money. The reverse happened in the
Mississippi lawsuit; after polls of potential jurors showed them 2 to
1 against the proposed lawsuit, the State's lawyers filed in Chancery
where the case would be heard by a judge without a jury.
2 14
Restitution has two branches, legal and equitable. The first
Restatement of Restitution was organized into a mostly legal
restitution first half, Part I, and a mostly equitable restitution
second half, Part 11.215 Dobbs preserves the legal-equitable division
of restitution in chapter 4 of his 1993 edition of Law of Remedies:
Damages-Equity-Restitution.
16
The vocabulary of legal restitution when the claimant seeks
money recovery comes from the law of contracts. It begins with
"general assumpsit" or "indebitatus assumpsit" and may be stated
as "quasi-contract," the best known term today, and as being based
on a "contract implied-in-law." Legal restitution is further subdi-
vided into "money -had and received" and "quantum meruit."
Equitable restitution employs the language of trusts; its major
forms are constructive trusts, equitable liens, and subrogation.
The distinction between legal restitution and equitable restitu-
tion is confusing and not functional. A major source of confusion is
the use in legal restitution of the word "equitable" in a nontechnical
sense meaning fairness. "Equity," says Professor Dobbs, "is not a
jurisdictional statement but a standard about the goal or a standard
for judging what counts as unjust enrichment."21
214 See John Mintz & Ceci Connolly, Smoked/Two Lawyers Light a Match: Wounding
the Giant, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al (describing Mississippi lawsuit where jury trial
was avoided by State's lawyers due to jury disfavor of lawsuit).
215 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
216 DOBBS, supra note 176, §§ 4.2, 4.3 at 252-258.
217 Id. at 558 n.1. The description of legal restitution as "equitable," Professor Palmer
said, "refers merely to the way in which a case should be approached, since it is clear that the
action is at law and the relief given is a simple money judgment." PALMER, supra note 196,
§ 1.2 at 9.
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Nevertheless the legal restitution--equitable restitution distinc-
tion is real in the way lawyers know reality. Litigants are entitled
to a jury trial in legal restitution leading to a money judgment;
several leading restitution decisions were tried to juries.2 1 8
Equitable restitution, usually seeking a constructive trust, is tried
in Chancery without the participation of a jury.21
The State's "claims," it says, "are equitable, not legal."22 The
State argument that its cause of action and remedies are "clearly
restitutionary and equitable in nature"22' seems to be based on the
mistaken notion that all restitution is equitable. The State cites two
cases for the idea that restitution is equitable.222
Although the State's lawsuit was filed in Chancery, its
restitution-indemnity theory seems to me not equitable restitution.
Instead, because it seeks a money judgment, without any attribute
of equitable restitution-tracing, specific restitution, or personal
relief-the State's complaint seems to me to seek legal restitution,
quasi-contract variety, particularly when restitution relief is stated
to parallel compensatory damages. -3 If so, the defendants should
be entitled to a jury trial on the plaintiffs requests for a money
judgment for restitution and indemnity.
Although a jury trial was demanded by one of the tobacco
companies,24 their analysis of the jury trial issue is muddled. Atone point they assert the remedy the State is seeking is ordinary
218 Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969); Raven Red Ash
Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash.
1946).
219 Edwards v. Lees Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936); Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d
189 (N.Y. 1978).
'n Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 1, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
"' Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 37, Moore exrel. State v. American Tobacco
Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
22 Id. at 9 n.5.
2' PALMER, supra note 196, § 1.5(d); see Miller v. International Union ofUnited Brewery
Workers, 48 S.E.2d 252, 256 (Va. 1948) (distinguishing legal restitution and quasi-contract
from equitable restitution and constructive trust on the ground that successful quasi-contract
claimants receive money judgments for restitution while successful constructive trust
plaintiffs recover specific property).
" Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Demand for Jury of Defendant, The American




money damages, "the classic remedy at law."225 At other points,
however, the tobacco companies seem to accept the State's chancery
characterization of restitution-unjust enrichment. 26
The tobacco companies' missing contention is: The type of
restitution the State seeks is legal restitution, quasi-contract
variety, and the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.2 The tobacco
companies stick to the tort-personal injury-products liability
characterization, however, and do not make this argument.
The State's request for an injunction is in Chancery, or is
equitable. 228 The State asserts equitable cleanup jurisdiction,2 29 and
following Mississippi state practice, it refers to cleanup jurisdiction
as "pendant." Equitable cleanup worked as follows. If, prior to the
merger of chancery and law courts, a plaintiff in chancery sought
both a chancery remedy, an injunction, and legal damages, then the
chancellor could determine the facts and issue the injunction and
also "incidentally" award legal damages to "clean the case up."
However, the efficiency of a single chancery trial undermines the
litigants' right to a jury trial. After merger of law and equity, under
a leading federal Supreme Court jury trial decision, a claimant
seeking money recovery cannot plead a money damages claim as
equitable to defeat its opponent's right to a jury trial.30
Building on the classification of the State's basic restitution-
indemnity as legal restitution, I think defendant would be entitled
to a jury trial on the factual issues leading to legal restitution; the
judge-chancellor could then enter equitable relief, an injunction,
which is consistent with the jury's findings of fact on the legal
211issues.
' Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition at 11, Moore ex rel. State v. American
Tobacco Co. (Mviss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-1429).
' Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 6, Moore ex rel. State v.
American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
27 DOBBS, supra note 176, at 557.
' Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 8, 10, Moore ex reL. State v. American
Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
29 Id. at 11.
230 Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
23 See DOBBS, supra note 176, at 170-72 ("stating that inquiry would not proceed until




Mississippi case law recognizes chancellors' decisions on "legal
issues," equitable cleanup, as "pendant," as well as the reverse,
decisions by the circuit court on chancery issues. In an important
decision, the Mississippi court forbade a party from avoiding a jury
trial by hiding a money claim in equitable "camouflage," an
accounting. The court discussed the primacy of the litigants right
to a jury under the state constitution, cited the analysis in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Dairy Queen v. Wood,
2 32
and emphasized consideration of the substance, not the form, in
adjudicating jury trial issues.
233
Mississippi's restitution decisions, like many states', lack crisp
distinctions between legal and equitable restitution. The author
was unable to find Mississippi decisions holding that legal restitu-
tion required a jury trial on demand. Mississippi restitution
decisions seem to include several chancery court decisions on "legal"
restitution where the lawsuit or the issue was either under exclu-
sive "equitable jurisdiction" or where the litigants had apparently
waived the right to a jury trial by not requesting one. In two claims
against a decedent's estate, the Mississippi court approved appar-
ently legal restitution in chancery.234 In a chancery suit for an
easement seeking an injunction, the Mississippi court approved
apparently legal restitution. 35 One anomalous chancery action for
a realty commission ended with a remedy labeled "quasi contract,"
which may have been an implied-in-fact contract, not restitution at
all.235 In Mississippi, restitution in equitable distribution after
2u 369 U.S. 467 (1962).
' Thompson v. First Mississippi Nat'l Bank & Mut. Say. Life Ins. Co., 427 So.2d 973,
976 (Miss. 1983); see Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1989) (noting that court
rebuffed claimant's characterization of defamation action as chancery action for accounting).
' See Estate of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922 (Miss. 1987) (recognizing case tried
before Chancellor as quantum meruit, legal restitution); Old Men's Home, Inc. v. Lee's Estate,
4 So.2d 235 (Miss. 1941) (recognizing as quasi contract, legal restitution, and citing legal
restitution).
Fourth Davis Island Land Co. v. Parker, 469 So.2d 516 (Miss. 1985).
See Magnolia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Randal Craft Realty Co., 342 So.2d 1308,
1311-12 (Miss. 1977) (relying on theory of quasi contract).
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divorce as well as suits for quiet title and ownership have been
deemed equitable restitution.3 7
Although the tobacco companies may have inadvertently waived
the argument that they were entitled to a jury trial, the issue is
worth examining if only to test the quality of their research and
thought. The Mississippi Supreme Court, if properly presented with
the issue, might have followed its strong tradition of jury trial and
pierced the State's position that restitution is equitable. If there
had been a jury, the State's survey research indicated the State
would have encountered difficulty empaneling a jury that favored its
contentions.
X. EVALUATION CONTINUED: ENRICHMENT? UNJUST? REALLY?
Even in a bench trial, the State would have to convince the
chancellor to accept its contentions. Orderly analysis of unjust
enrichment usually begins by first locating the defendant's enrich-
ment or benefit and then moving to whether it was unjust.
The plaintiffs first step in an unjust enrichment action is to
establish defendants' enrichment or benefit. Benefit in the State's
restitution theory, based on the Restatement of Restitution section
1, is a broad concept. The court may find that the defendant has
been benefited or enriched through the plaintiffs actions where the
plaintiff has satisfied defendant's debt or duty, has in any way
added to defendant's security or advantage, has added to defen-
dant's property, has saved the defendant an expense, or has
conferred any form of advantage on the defendant.
2 38
A plaintiff who has paid "the defendant's debt or other enforce-
able liability to a third person" may, under some circumstances,
recover restitution from the defendant.3 9 If, however, the plaintiff
"knowingly and without the defendant's request" pays defendant's
"' See Dudley v. Light, 586 So.2d 155, 159-60 (Miss. 1991) (granting equitable lien,
equitable restitution to parent in divorce case, and citing equitable restitution parts of
Restatement); Koval v. Koval, 576 So.2d 134, 137-38 (Miss. 1991) (enforcing oral contract to
convey property and finding equitable lien); Hans v. Hans, 482 So.2d 1117, 1122-23 (Miss.
1986) (finding constructive trust and equitable restitution in quiet title action).





unliquidated obligation to Sam,240 plaintiff cannot recover restitu-
tion from the defendant unless there is "something more." For
example, if the plaintiff pays Sam by mistake, thinking he owed the
debt, that is "something more."241 The defendant's benefit is clear,
for the plaintiff has discharged its debt, obligation or liability. The
issue of the defendant's benefit arises when the defendant requested
the plaintiffs payment to Sam, but when the defendant had no
obligation to Sam.242
The plaintiffs first step in unjust enrichment is showing defen-
dant's enrichment as a benefit. The tobacco companies argue they
were not enriched.2 4' A defendant must have "economic benefit" as
a prerequisite to restitution.244 Under restitution, tobacco compa-
nies were not enriched; they had no economic benefit. Only if the
tobacco companies were liable to the smokers for damages would the
State's Medicaid payments to the smokers be an "economic benefit"
to the tobacco companies. 245 The tobacco companies would have
been enriched if the State had paid an obligation the tobacco
companies really owed. A restitution-indemnity plaintiff who
discharges a duty to the defendant owed may recover from the
defendant. But the tobacco companies had no duty to the smokers.
The State cannot recover its payments for the smokers' health care
costs from the tobacco companies as restitution-indemnity unless
the tobacco companies were liable to the smokers.
Recent precedent supports the tobacco companies' contention
about the absence of any benefit. The first is Kentucky Laborers
District Council Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hill & Knowlton,
240 Id.
241 PALMER, supra note 196, § 22.2 (addressing plaintiffs performance of unliquidated
obligation of defendant).
21Z See id. ch. 33 (discussing restitution based on payment or transfer to third parties).
213 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings at 1, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996)
(No. 94-1429) (arguing that "plaintiffs damage claims fail to satisfy essential prerequisites
of equity").
244 Id. This statement is narrower than the quoted decision, Omnibank of Mantee v.
United S. Bank, 607 9.2d 76, 92 (Miss. 1992). As the quoted court explained, an economic
benefit "includes positive profits, a loss avoided, as well as discharge of debts."
24 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 2, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429)
(arguing that "plaintiffs damage claims fail to satisfy essential prerequisites of equity").
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Inc.2 46 The Fund, having paid smoker-participants' medical claims
for maladies caused by tobacco, claimed that its medical payments
unjustly enriched tobacco companies. 47 The Fund's restitution
theory is the same as the State's: we paid claims the tobacco
companies ought to have paid. 48 The argument assumes that the
tobacco companies were obligated to pay the smokers' medical
expenses.249 The court, however, did not think the Fund's payment
to the smokers conferred a benefit on the tobacco companies because
the payment did not discharge any obligation or debt the tobacco
companies owed the smokers. 2 ° "A perceived [tobacco companies']
moral duty [to pay the smokers' tobacco-caused medical expenses]
is no substitute for a substantive legal requirement."251' The Fund
had a contractual or legal obligation to pay the smokers' medical
expenses, but the tobacco companies did not. 52 The Fund's payment
did not confer a benefit on the tobacco companies; and, since the
tobacco companies were not enriched, they could not have been
unjustly enriched. 53
The second recent precedent is Laborers Local 17 Health &
Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc.254 The court responded to the
Union fund's argument (we paid claims the tobacco companies ought
to have paid) by observing that the fund incurred expenses "at the
behest" of recipients. 55 The court concurred by stating that the
fund "did not confer a benefit" on the tobacco companies. 2 6 The
court concluded that the tobacco companies' liability, absent
Medicaid, "is too speculative to constitute a benefit."257
246 24 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. Ky. 1998).






' Id. See also Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 970-72 (E.D. Tex.
1997).
7 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 1999 WL 639865 (2d Cir.
1999).





The State's externality theory of benefit is its most creative
argument. The State argues that the tobacco companies "have been
unjustly enriched by not having to bear the intended by-products of
their enterprise-the enormous health care costs."25 Such costs the
State paid, in part, conferred a benefit on the tobacco companies
"and saved them from great expense."2 9 Furthermore, the State
contends that the "defendants have so unfairly exploited the State's
mandate to provide public health care that equity demands they
make restitution by bearing the costs which have been borne by the
State."26 In plain, ordinary English, the tobacco companies were
freeloaders.
"The most dramatic economic function of the common law," Judge
Posner wrote, "is to correct externalities." '261 Everyone is exposed to
some negative consequences from others' economic activity; this
exposure is one consequence of life in a complex economy. An
externality is an economic cost to others that the creator is not
legally responsible for and is not required to take into account. It is
a complex combination of economic theory and legal doctrine. The
economic theory part is "cost"; the legal doctrine part is responsibil-
ity.
The government will not repress all of a person's economic
activity that affects others, not even all that harms others. When
should the government make the person pay those its activity
harmed? The issue for policymakers' judgment is how much of an
enterprise's activity's cost to others is too much for them to bear.
Economists say that policymakers should suppress an "inefficient"
externality.2 62 In the end the question of when to internalize the
externality is a legal-political judgment made by government
officials, usually judges and legislatures.
"' See Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 23, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1429) (arguing that State's actions enriched defendants).
25t id.
260 Id.
2 1 POSNER, supra note 45, at 274 (noting that common law also functions to reduce
transaction costs by creating property rights).
2 See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 77 (1997) CLiability for perfectly compensatory damages
provides incentives for efficient precaution by injurers in many economic models.").
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An externality is suppressed by internalizing it. Common law
courts define property rights and create liability rules to internalize
an activity's cost to others by requiring the producer responsible for
the activity to pay what the court deems to be its rightful expenses.
The government's rules of legal liability force the creator to pay for
the consequences of its activity. The reasoning is that if the creator
must pay the consequences, it will, in the future, consider the cost.
"The threat of liability is a kind of price charged in advance that
leads the potential injurer (in most instances) to take steps to
prevent injury from occurring."263
Returning to the State's externality theory of benefit, the tobacco
companies decide to use a resource, to sell tobacco, without taking
into account the way tobacco adversely affects buyers' health.
Essentially, the tobacco companies may ignore the smokers'
illnesses because jury verdicts against smokers mean the tort
system has allowed those effects to fall on the smokers and others.
Tobacco's bad health consequences have been an externality for the
tobacco companies. Holding the tobacco companies liable for
tobacco's health consequences to smokers would internalize the
externality.
The idea that the health costs of tobacco are a tobacco company
externality which courts ought to develop liability rules to internal-
ize has been expressed under at least two other legal subject
headings, equal protection and tort-products liability. Under the
Equal Protection Clause "there is no barrier ... to an action for
reimbursement of Medicaid funds from a specific industry which
reaps considerable financial benefit from the sale of its products, but
which causes significant state funds to be expended to treat the
harms its products cause."264
Under tort, "[c]igarette manufacturers thus receive a windfall
because they collect profits on sales of their product, but do not pay
its true costs." '265 Similarly, "Why should not the price of a pack of
cigarettes or a can of beer reflect the enormous costs of lung cancer
263 See POSNER, supra note 45, at 289 (noting that contributory negligence system
provides incentive to ban injuries and victims).
2' Jana Schrink Strain, Note, Medicaid vs. The Tobacco Industry: A Reasonable
Legislative Solution to a State's Financial Woes?, 30 IND. L. REV. 851, 879 (1997).
2 Wertheimer, supra note 73, at 1447.
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and drunk driving injuries that are very often borne by innocent
third parties and by the public at large through private and public
health care insurance mechanisms?" '266 "[I]f product category
defectiveness is not allowed, [the price of cigarettes] will artificially
exclude . . .arguably excessive [health] costs which are instead
externalized to a large extent on other persons. '6 7
The State's use of the economic theory of externality to establish
the "defendants' benefit" prerequisite for Restatement section 1
restitution is a creative application of legal reasoning. The
externality theory's absence of success in establishing the compa-
nies' responsibility under equal protection or products liability,
however, ought to cause the observer to wonder whether a court
would accept it under the heading of restitution.
The State puts forward other theories of the tobacco companies'
benefit. Specifically, the State's Medicaid payments to the smokers
reduced or eliminated the smokers' incentive to sue the tobacco
companies, which, by saving the tobacco companies' litigation
expenses, unjustly enriched them.6 8 The State's Medicare pay-
ments provided indigent smokers, who might otherwise have gone
without it, with medical care, and the State relieved the tobacco
companies of the "public relations nightmare" of smokers lacking
medical care which might have encouraged a "political backlash"
against the tobacco companies.269 Finally, lack of tobacco companies'
enrichment-benefit is "a mere technicality" because "the State has
still performed a responsibility that equity and good policy dictate
should have been performed by the defendants." 7 ' The State's ideas
are creative; but they either recycle the externality theory of benefit
or extend benefit beyond the concept as expressed in the Restate-
ment. Not being sued and not encountering public reactions and
264 Owen, supra note 73, at 1255-56.
2 Owen, supra note 73, at 1257 n.5.
216 See Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 23-23, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco
Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1429) (arguing that state's actions enriched
defendants); Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 42-43, Moore ex rel. State v. American
Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429) (arguing that defendants have been
enriched by state's actions).
"' Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 24, Moore (No. 94-1429).
2 u Id. at 23-24.
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political hassles are too speculative and too remote to count as
benefits under section 1.
Precedent supports the tobacco companies' contention that
creation of an alleged medical care externality does not benefit the
creator and create liability for restitution. In San Francisco v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,27' the government plaintiffs sought restitution
from tobacco companies, arguing that the tobacco companies were
not paying the medical expenses of smoking.27 1 The court rejected
the claimants' externality theory of enrichment-benefit. 73 If the
tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because they saved on
medical expense, this enrichment was, the court said, at the
smokers' expenseY.4 The tobacco companies, however, lacked a duty
"to individual smokers to cover the costs of their medical care. '275
The court dismissed the Fund's unjust enrichment claim. 76
Plaintiffs, the court concluded, have asked the court to stretch its
broad "equitable" powers too far. 7
If a firm's savings constituted enrichment or a benefit which
triggered restitution in favor of someone affected by the activity, the
law of restitution would be enlarged. Once a court finds a defendant
liable for restitution, the court may measure plaintiffs recovery by
the defendant's savings.278 The next step is to expand use of
defendant's savings from measurement of restitution after liability
is established and use it to create initial liability for restitution.
This step would introduce restitution into spheres where it would be
difficult to administer and where liability has traditionally been
determined under other bodies of doctrine. Two examples follow.
First, although a polluter "saves" by not installing pollution
control devices, courts have adjudicated polluters' liability to
homeowners under nuisance, not restitution. "[R]estitution,"
Professor Palmer emphasized, "would come as a surprise .... No
271 957 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997).




276 Id. at 1145.
277 Id. at 1144.
27 See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652,654 (Wash. 1946) (measuring plaintiffs
restitution recovery by defendant's savings).
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one supposes, I believe, that the homeowners are entitled to recover
this [polluter's] saving of expense on a theory of unjust
enrichment." '279
Second, under the familiar formula set out in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.,2"' courts take a negligent defendant's savings
into account in determining its liability for damages.28' Suppose a
tort defendant saved an expense by neglecting to take a safety
precaution and, as a result, injury to the plaintiff occurred. If the
probability of a casualty times the magnitude of the plaintiffs loss
exceeds the defendant's saved precaution cost, then, under Judge
Learned Hand's formula, the defendant was negligent.282 But the
defendant's liability is for damages to compensate plaintiff, not for
restitution measured by defendant's savings. Indeed, the "savings"
measure of a plaintiffs recovery would be unwise. In addition to
reducing a victim's incentives to sue to enforce liability and being
difficult to administer and measure, restitution calculated by
defendant's savings would be too low to internalize efficient cost
avoidance; this result would distort the Carroll Towing formula and
terminate it as a way to set an efficient level of precaution.283
The material above supports my conjecture that it would be
unlikely for a court to expand the concept of "benefit" to include a
defendant's savings from not paying for injuries it "ought" to pay,
but is not legally liable to pay. The prudent observer of restitution,
however, will never say never. "No single comprehensive definition
of benefit in quasi-contract[-restitution] is possible, 284 wrote then-
Professor Timothy Sullivan. "The central function of quasi-
contract[-restitution] in providing a remedy in extremis may explain
27' See PALMER, supra note 196, at 137 (noting that restitution would be denied in case
of polluting industrial plant because of difficulty in measuring proper recovery); Daniel
Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the
Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 509 (1980) (explaining that property
approach to restitution "provides no basis for a claim of restitution in cases which the
defendant has benefited at the plaintiffs expense through conduct that was either not
wrongful or was legally excused or justified").
'0 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
" Id. at 173 (considering burden of adequate precautions to determine liability).
282 Id.
POSNER, supra note 45, § 6.10.




why no wholly consistent or comprehensive definition of benefit is
possible or even desirable.""2 5 Professor Palmer, who valued precise
rules and promulgated them through four technical volumes,
summarized his study of benefit generally. "The term 'benefit,"' he
said, "has no single meaning in the law of restitution; instead,
meaning will vary with the circumstances, especially with the
ground for restitution."286
Two examples will illustrate the difficulty of predicting what a
court might call a "benefit." First, discussing multiple damages for
violations of antitrust, Mr. Douglas Melamed, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice, described an externality, "the full extent of
the [tort victim's] loss," as a "transfer" from the plaintiff, or victim,
to the tortfeasor.287 Perhaps, unless the court imposes liability on
the tortfeasor requiring it to pay the victim's loss, that is
internalizes the externality, Mr. Melamed would reason that the
"transfer" will "benefit" the future defendant.
Second, when tortfeasor Alice pays the victim and seeks to
recover the payment from tortfeasor Ben because Ben was "more"
liable to the victim, a court will order indemnity. The comments to
the second Torts Restatement's indemnity section adopt the
Restatement of Restitution's idea that defendant-Ben's saved
expense from not paying the victim is a benefit, and they use the
benefit to explain the unjust enrichment basis for Alice's
indemnity.28 A court could employ this savings-as-benefit approach
in section 1 of the Restatement of Restitution.
Emergency is the State's next theory of defendants' unjust
enrichment-restitution, which requires some background. In a
market economy people have a right to choose freely how to spend
their money. As the law school classroom hypothetical of Paula
who, unsolicited, mows Dan's lawn and sends Dan a bill that
remains unpaid teaches us, if someone confers an unsolicited benefit
on another, the recipient may decline to pay. A court, moreover,
2 Id. at 1.
' PALMER, supra note 196, § 1.8, at 44. (citing Sullivan, supra note 285).
'2 A. Douglas Melamed, Damages, Deterrence, and Antitrust- A Comment on Cooter,
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95 (1997).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(B) cmt. c (1979).
906 [Vol. 33:847
COMMON LAW RESTITUTION
ought to deny Paula restitution: Dan was benefitted, but his
enrichment was not unjust. Courts are careful to protect Dan's
autonomy and his right to bargain and form contracts. 289 The court
may even label Paula with the epithet of a "volunteer" or an
"intermeddler," even an "officious intermeddler" to justify its denial
of restitution.29 °
Bargaining, however, is not always possible. For example, when
a medical professional treats an unconscious accident victim,29' the
Restatement allows restitution.292 It is unlikely that requiring the
victim to pay the professional interferes with the victim's autonomy
or right to choose. While the unconscious victim lacked an opportu-
nity to decide, because most people, if unconscious, would prefer to
be treated, the professional's treatment is consistent with the
bargain that would have been made.
The State's emergency restitution argument grew out of a
variation on the medical professional. Plaintifffurnishes unsolicited
emergency medical care to a child whose parent has a legal obliga-
tion to support and care for the child, then plaintiff seeks to recover
restitution from the child's parent on the ground the parent had a
duty to furnish the medical care. Plaintiffs care of the child
benefitted the child's parent because it satisfied the parent's legal
obligation to the child. After a parent fails to furnish something
"essential" to her child, plaintiff may meet the child's need and
qualify for restitution from the parent.293
The State sought restitution under the preceding branch of the
emergency doctrine for its Medicare payments to smokers; it argued
that in an emergency the State performed the tobacco companies'
duty to pay for infirmities caused by tobacco.294
2 DOBBS, supra note 176, § 4.9(2) C(Where defendant has a right to choose for himself
whether to receive a benefit, and where restitution would deprive him of this choice by
requiring payment of a 'benefit' the defendant may not want, restitution is often denied.").
290 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 2 (1937).
"9 Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907) (finding "implied contract" when patient
unconscious and treated by plaintiff).
292 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 114, 116 (1937).
2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.4(a) (1978); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
' See Plaintiffs Memorandum Brief and Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings at 23, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Nov. 28,
1994) (No. 94-1429) (citing Restatement of Restitution § 1 cmt. b defining "benefit").
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The State's emergency restitution theory has two serious hurdles
to surmount: (1) Did the tobacco companies have a "duty" to the
smokers? (2) Was the smokers' situation dire enough to qualify as
an emergency?
(1) The tobacco companies' "duty": The tobacco companies argue
they had no legal duty to the smokers which required them to pay
the smokers' medical expenses. The tobacco companies have no
relationship with the smokers established by law analogous to
parent-child to create an obligation to furnish medical care. In
smokers' products liability litigation, the tobacco companies had not
been held liable to the smokers.
The State avoids the "legal duty" argument by assuming the
tobacco companies had a duty or burden to the smokers; it argues
that it performed the tobacco companies' "manifest duty" to care for
the smokers.295 Does the State benefit the tobacco companies
because it discharges their "manifest duty"?29.
The idea that Pat, who may in an emergency perform Darlene's
"manifest duty" to avert Vera's peril, may then recover restitution
from Darlene comes from Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation
v. Overseas Oil Carriers.97 and United States v. Consolidated Edison
Company of New York (Con Ed).298 In Peninsular, Overseas
provided medical care to Peninsular's seaman.9 9 In Con Ed, the
United States furnished Con Ed electrical power for its customers. 30 0
That neither defendant had a legal duty to do what the emergency
plaintiff did led the courts to find defendants' manifest duties as
foundations for granting plaintiffs restitution recovery.
2 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 22, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co.
(Miss. Ch. filed Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1429); See Plaintiffs Memorandum Brief and Response
to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 22, Moore (No. 94-1429) (arguing
state entitled to restitution because it performed defendants' manifest duty in caring for
victims of smoking).
2 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings at 3, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. fied Feb. 22, 1996)
(No. 94-1429) (arguing that defendants have not by state payment of medical expenses).
Holding "no" is Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 970-72 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
297 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
2w 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978).
Peninsular, 553 F.2d at 833.
s Consolidated Edison, 580 F.2d at 1123.
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Peninsular and Con Ed present straightforward situations to
grant plaintiffs restitution but not for the reason the courts gave.
Both plaintiffs, upon defendants' requests, rendered valuable
services to defendants under circumstances which not only negated
a gift but also communicated an expectation of payment. The
plaintiffs might even have thought there was a contract. Defen-
dants, knowing of the plaintiffs' services, the circumstances, and the
plaintiffs' expectations of payment, freely accepted the benefits. In
what commentators often call free-acceptance cases, restitution,
often labeled quantum meruit, ought to be straightforward." 1 The
court's difficult issue is how to measure free acceptance restitution
once granted; when a contract between the parties fails for want of
a technicality like a writing or formal authority, the difficult
question is whether a court can measure claimant's restitution in a
way that respects the reason to deny it contractual remedies." 2
Restitution in Con Ed is particularly straightforward because
there the plaintiff conferred benefits on defendant under an
agreement which did not qualify plaintiff for contract remedies only
because of the statute of frauds." 3 The Con Ed court's "manifest
duty" theory grows out of the court's unnecessary and inappropriate
analysis of benefit."0 4 In Con Ed, the utility's "manifest duty" to
supply electricity to customers is an alternative holding essential to
plaintiffs restitution recovery only because of the court's manifestly
incorrect understanding of the enrichment-benefit part of unjust
enrichment. "Manifest duty" is not a solid foundation on which to
build the State's emergency restitution theory.
(2) 'qmmediate Necessity". The tobacco companies further argue
that the State's payments were not immediately necessary measures
to protect the public health or safety. If the State had furnished
medical care directly to infirm citizens in dire need, a court would
be more likely to find an immediate necessity. Where the State
'I' LORD GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 19 (Gareth Jones ed., 4th ed.
1993) (noting that in free acceptance cases, defendant "cannot deny that he has been unjustly
enriched"); PALMER, supra note 294, §§ 7.4, 14.5, 15.11.
"0 2 & 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 7.4, 14.5, 15.11 (1978).
" Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 n.15 (1995)
(concluding that Con Ed invited straightforward application of unjust enrichment).
' The Con Ed court's incorrect analysis is in note 7. Id.; GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW
OF RESTITUTION § 1.8, at 47 & n.3 (Supp. 1999).
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seeks reimbursement for medical care already furnished by others,
a court would have to stretch the meaning of the words to find
"immediate necessity."
Several lawsuits where plaintiffs who removed asbestos or
contamination hazards sued manufacturers-suppliers for emergency
restitution to recover for the cost of removal have survived defen-
dants' pleading and summary judgment motions. These "abate-
ment" decisions deal with both of the difficult emergency issues,
duty and necessity.
The plaintiffs' emergency restitution argument in an abatement
decision runs as follows. AsbesCon created a hazard by putting a
lethal substance in Skule's property, and unless the risk of harm
from the hazard is obviated, AsbesCon has at least a tort-products
liability duty to pay damages for any loss the contamination causes.
An emergency exists because of the health risk to the public and
users; moreover, Skule is at risk because, as property owner, it may
be liable. If Skule abates the hazard, ameliorating the risk, Skule
has performed AsbesCon's "duty" to abate, and AsbesCon will be
unjustly enriched unless it reimburses Skule. °5
The Illinois Supreme Court's asbestos abatement decision rejects
the foregoing approach to emergency restitution."6 In a plaintiffs
restitution action for emergency asbestos abatement, that court held
that the defendant must have had a duty established independently
to act and must have failed to act. The asbestos suppliers, the court
continued, had no duty to inspect, to repair, or to remove the
asbestos.0 7
3 See, e.g., Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 182, 189, 209
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing cause of action for unjust enrichment under similar facts); City
of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 1992 WL 98482, at *11 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 1992)
(recognizing emergency restitution for reimbursement of cost of lead paint removal);
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co, 752 F. Supp. 286, 302-04 (D. Minn. 1990)
(applying emergency assistance doctrine to support plaintiffs restitution claim under similar
facts); City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding
that where city performs defendant's duty in an "immediate necessity" to protect decency,
health or safety, it may recover expense to abate and clean up and to treat and monitor
children); City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), afrld,
513 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1987) (finding cause of action for school board seeking to recover
for asbestos removal under indemnity and emergency restitution).
' Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C, & S, Inc., 546 N.E. 2d 580 (InI. 1989).




Under contemporary "notice" pleading, judges routinely deny
defendant's motions addressed to a plaintiffs complaint; this often
prolongs litigation and may lead to settlement. The decisions
allowing plaintiffs to proceed with emergency restitution after
plaintiff abated or ameliorated an actively dangerous contamination
provide some support for the State's emergency theory of restitution.
The analogy between that situation and Medicaid recovery is
imperfect, however; the contamination plaintiffs actually removed
a danger, making it easier to argue an "immediate necessity" to act
than the State which reimbursed medical professionals after they
had treated the smokers. The Mississippi Supreme Court's
restitution decisions have not shown any marked tendency to
innovate. The Illinois court's less expansive reading of emergency
provides an alternative more in keeping with traditional doctrine
that the Mississippi court might have followed.
Indemnity is the last of the State's theories to support its
restitution recovery. An alternative formulation of the State's
restitution theory maintains that the State has paid "a burden
which in all good conscience and equity the defendants should
bear."3" 8 This combines the Restatement's section 1 theory-broad
freestanding restitution based only on defendant's unjust enrich-
ment-with indemnity in a creative way that obviates the usual
prerequisite for indemnity-the defendant must have had an
obligation to the plaintiffs payee.
Some background is needed."0 9 Indemnity occurs between two
tortfeasors, Alf and Bob, who are both liable to Van, an injured
victim, for the same harm. Bob is "more" liable and Alf is "less"
liable. Alf, the future indemnity claimant and the "less" liable
tortfeasor, satisfies the two tortfeasors' dual liability to Van, the
injured person, either by settling or by paying a judgment.
Claimant-Alf then seeks to avoid being forced, because of his "lesser"
" Plaintiffs Memorandum Brief and Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 3, Moore exrel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Nov. 28, 1994)
(No. 94-1429).
Seegenerally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 886B & cmts. (1979); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32 cmts. & n. (Proposed Final Draft
Revised 1999). The annual meeting of the American Law Institute in May 1999 approved the
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY draft.
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liability to Van, to continue to bear the cost that the indemnity
defendant, Bob, who is more at fault in causing Van's injury, should
bear. The indemnity claimant, All, proves that although "less"
liable to Van, the injured victim, he has nevertheless paid Van. Bob,
the indemnity defendant, who has not paid, was "more" liable to the
injured person. Because Claimant-Alifs payment to Van benefitted
or enriched Bob, the indemnity defendant, the court ought to order
Bob, the "more" responsible person, to pay restitution to or to
indemnify Alf, the "less" liable payor, for if Bob does not pay Alf, Bob
would continue to be unjustly enriched. 1'
There are other, more precise, ways than "more" liable and "less"
liable to phrase the relationship between Alf, the indemnity
claimant, and Bob, the indemnity defendant. The claimant, if liable
vicariously to the injured person, may recover indemnity from the
directly liable tortfeasor, the indemnity defendant.311 A negligent
indemnity claimant may recover indemnity from a defendant if the
claimant's negligence was "passive" and the defendant's was
"active." Sometimes a negligent indemnity claimant may recover
indemnity from a defendant if the claimant's liability was "second-
ary" and the defendant's was "primary.
312
In the Mississippi Medicaid recovery, although according to the
lawsuit the State was not a tortfeasor, it has state constitutional,
statutory, and common law duties to infirm citizens. The State's
indemnity-restitution theory begins with the State's duty to provide
health care to Medicare patients. The tobacco companies, the State
argues, have a "duty to the public not to distribute unreasonably
dangerous and deadly products."313 The State, because it pays for
the smokers' tobacco-related health care costs, may recover the
310 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(1) (1979).
3,1 Id. § 886B(2).
312 The passive-active and secondary-primary phrasings ofthe tortfeasors culpability are
anachronisms from the all-or-nothing days of contributory negligence and incongruous with
comparative negligence because the tortfeasors' degrees of responsibility can be factored into
the comparative negligence calculation instead of creating an all-or-nothing indemnity.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32, cmt. e & n.(Proposed Final
Draft Revised 1999). Other examples of indemnity occur when the defendant has contracted
to indemnify the claimant or the claimant was a product seller, not otherwise culpable, of a
product the defendant supplied.
"' Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Challenges at 56, Moore exrel. State v. American Tobacco
Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Oct. 14, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
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payment in indemnity from the tobacco companies, the tortfeasors,
even though the smokers may not have been able to recover from
tobacco companies. The State has discharged a duty to infirm
smokers which it owed them under its Medicaid statutes. Between
the State and the tobacco companies, however, the tobacco compa-
nies should have discharged these expenses. Therefore, the State
is entitled to indemnity from the tobacco companies.
The State's indemnity theory faces some formidable hurdles. The
State's assumption that the tobacco companies "should" have
discharged the smokers' medical expenses expresses an aspiration,
not an established legal duty, and stretches the existing law. The
tobacco companies argue that under existing law an indemnity
claimant cannot recover indemnity unless the indemnity defendant
owed an obligation to the claimant's payee.314 The indemnity
claimant must show the indemnity defendant's underlying legal
liability.3" 5 The tobacco companies had escaped legal liability for
smokers' medical care. The tobacco companies' subrogation
argument requires the State to take the smokers" claims with all
defenses the tobacco companies would have available against the
smokers.
The State relies on the first Restatement of Restitution's indem-
nity provision.316 "A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged
a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to
indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the
wrongful nature of his conduct." '17 Like many legal rules, the first
Restatement's black letter indemnity rule is too broadly stated.
The section's "should have been discharged by the other"
language is overinclusive and excessively spacious because readers
may understand "should" as "ought" in the sense of fairness and
aspiration. "Should" seems to mean "under the existing positive
314 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 6-7, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996) (No. 94-
1429); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft Revised 1999).
U5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft Revised 1999).




law." But the definition is unclear because the commentary declines
"to state the circumstances under which two persons are subject to
a duty, one of them rather than the other should perform it."318
More careful drafting in later restatements has sharpened the
analysis and supplanted the Restatement of Restitution's indemnity
provision. The indemnity sections' black letter rules in both the
second Torts Restatement and the proposed final draft of the
Restatement for apportionment of liability require both the indem-
nity claimant and the defendant to be tortfeasors. The Tort
Restatement begins, "[I]f two or more persons are liable in tort."319
The proposed final draft of the Restatement for Apportionment of
Liability begins, "When two or more persons' are or may be liable for
the same harm." 2 ' Each negates the State's argument based on the
earlier "should have been discharged" phrasing from the 1937
Restitution Restatement.
Under almost all versions of indemnity, an indemnity defendant
may compel the indemnity claimant to establish its liability to the
victim in court; the indemnity claimant, Alf, must prove the
indemnity defendant, Bob, would have been liable to Van, the
injured person, under positive law.21 As is usual in this research,
however, language as general as the Restatement of Restitution's
indemnity section affords a basis for the State's expansive and
creative contentions. Certainly a court could accept it literally and
establish liability where none existed before.
The Torts Restatement's indemnity provision, moreover, is
explicitly based on defendant's unjust enrichment.322 Language in
the section's reporter's comments, recognizing "possible develop-
ments," mentions the courts' "unexpressed premise .. . that
indemnity should be granted in any factual situation in which, as
between the parties themselves, it is just and fair that the
8 Id. cmt. b.
3,9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 86B(1) (1979).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32(a) (Proposed
Final Draft Revised 1999).
"2 Id. § 32 cmt. c.
'2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(1) (1979) (stating claimant is entitled
to indemnity if the defendant would otherwise '%e unjustly enriched at his expense by the
discharge of the liability").
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indemnitor should bear the total responsibility."2 ' Under the
general "just and fair" approach, a court may have held the tobacco
companies liable to the State for indemnity for the State's Medicaid
payments to infirm smokers.
How likely was that? Precedent from the Iowa Medicaid recovery
lawsuit against tobacco companies supports the tobacco companies'
contrary contentions. "Indemnity was allowed [in earlier cases]
because the law imposed liability on one person for the actionable
conduct of another," observed the Iowa Supreme Court, rejecting the
state of Iowa's indemnity claim. 24 The defendant may prove the
defenses it would have had if the injured person had sued the
defendant. 2 5
The State's indemnity argument relies next on exceptions to the
rule that the indemnity claimant must establish the defendant's
underlying tort liability to the injured person. There are defenses
which Bob, the indemnity defendant, could have claimed against the
victim but which are not available if Alf, the indemnity claimant,
sues him.
If, when Alf seeks indemnity from Bob, the statute of limitations
has run on the injured victim's cause of action against Bob, Bob
cannot successfully interpose the statute of limitations applicable to
the injured victim's claim against Bob as a defense to Alf's demand.
Bob must pay the claimant. Claimant Alf's cause of action for
indemnity from Bob accrues when Alf pays Van, the injured person;
however, the statute of limitations on the indemnity cause of action
protects Bob, the indemnity defendant, from Alf's stale claims.326
Additionally, the court will let claimant Alf maintain a third-
party action for indemnity against indemnity-defendant Bob when
the victim's first-party action against Bob is barred by an immunity
or by workers compensation. Allowing the indemnity action should
depend on the policy behind the defense. Letting the State recover
indemnity from the tobacco companies means forbidding the tobacco
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(B) cmt. c. (1979).
' State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Iowa 1998).
RESrATEMENT CHIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 32 (Proposed Final
Draft Revised 1999).
m2RFSATEMENT tTHmD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENTOFLIABILITY § 32 cmt. d (Proposed
Final Draft Revised 1999).
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companies from using their assumption of risk and contributory
negligence defenses. The policies of assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence are to encourage care and to deter moral
hazard. Indemnity for the State from the tobacco companies will
not, the state maintains, thwart the policies of assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence.
This is a creative argument, but it extends the existing law. In
both the rule and the exceptions, Van, the tort victim, can prove the
elements of a tort against Bob; but in the State's Medicaid recovery,
smokers' products liability lawsuits against the tobacco companies
had not succeeded. The exceptions, statute of limitations, immu-
nity, and worker's compensation, where courts allow Alf to pay Van
and recover indemnity from Bob when Van could not have recovered
from Bob, arise when Van could have proved the "elements" of a
cause of action against Bob. The valid reasons to bar Van's claim
against Bob are inapplicable to Alfs claim against Bob, so Alf
proceeds based on Bob's fault and the policies of loss spreading and
fairness. The exceptions do not provide strong support for the
State's arguments for indemnity.
XI. RESTITUTION, RESTITUTION, WHERE ARE YoU?
Innovators build their creative steps on a foundation of mastery
of the prior art. "Genius," wrote historian Edward Gibbon more
than two centuries ago, "may anticipate the season of maturity; but
in the education of a people, as in that of an individual, memory
must be exercised, before the powers of reason and fancy can be
expanded; nor may the artist hope to equal or surpass, till he has
learned to imitate, the works of his predecessors.""'
Restitution is an arduous prior art to master. The basic princi-
ples, enrichment and unjustness, are abstract. The vocabulary of
restitution recycles words from "related" parts of the common law
without warnings of changed definitions. Few, if any, lawyers are
restitution specialists the way other lawyers are estate planners or
litigators; but restitution issues arise in every kind of dispute. The
3" EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DEcLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 909
(David Womersley ed., 1994).
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contemporary law school is not dissipating the fog around restitu-
tion, for only a few law schools have separate upper-level elective
courses in Restitution; most Remedies courses include a chapter on
restitution and scatter restitution decisions in other locations.328
Before commencing a serious effort to develop a particular topic,
a lawyer ought to understand restitution's vocabulary and funda-
mentals. A researcher should begin by learning the basic distinc-
tions.3 29 The task is formidable. For one thing the digest topics are
diffuse.33' A researcher using numbered headnotes and digests may
not have found two of the restitution decisions cited in this Article
because inaccurate headnotes hide restitution under other
subjects.
331
The restitution law of one state may not be thorough or sophisti-
cated; for example the Mississippi court's restitution decisions
exhibit common sense to reach sound and predictable results, but
the author, preparing this Article, did not unearth distinctions
between legal restitution and equitable restitution bearing on the
right to a jury trial. Courts do not use consistent terminology,
making computer word searches unproductive or even deceptive.
Judges may not have enough restitution on their dockets to develop
proficiency, and frequent judicial misunderstandings 32 impede
researchers from achieving understanding through case analysis.
The sources for a restitution tyro's beginning of general under-
standing are treatises and restatements. Dobbs's introductory
Chapter 4 is indispensable; the place to start to learn the vocabulary
and basic distinctions, even it may be hard going in spots. 333 The
four-volume Palmer restitution treatise, bristling with technicality,
is not for those who run to read. The 876-page Restitution Restate-
1 RENDLEMAN, supra note 98, ch. 4.
See DOBBS, supra note 176, § 4.1(3) (discussing procedures and terms of restitution).
See John Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HAST. L.J. 1087, 1097
(1968) (outlining various sources for materials on restitution).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 580 F.2d 1122 (2d
Cir. 1978) (including restitution issue under topic "Electricity"); Board of Educ. v. A, C, & S,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1989) (including restitution issue under "Products Liability").
S3 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 580 F.2d at 1126 n.7 (finding that defendanes loss or
detriment is essential to a restitution case); see supra note 304 and accompanying text
(discussing Consolidated Edison).
*" DOBBS, supra note 176, ch. 4; Peter Davis, Note, Restitution: Concept and Terms, 19
HAST. L.J. 1167 (1968).
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ment, published in 1937,"' 4 was written under a conception of law
and equity many contemporary lawyers find baffling. Restatements
are usually used one section at a time; few busy lawyers and judges
will be willing to read the whole thing. Both the State's and the
tobacco companies' arguments reveal apparent reading of state-
ments out of context and reading single Restatement sections
without a firm grasp of the whole.
Moving the common law to a place it has never been is a
daunting task. Entrenched abuses are invisible to many and
require effort to identify and eradicate. Change is difficult and
always affects other values. The State's basic creative move was to
articulate the concept that tobacco-caused medical expenses are a
tobacco-companies' externality and to transmogrify the tobacco
companies' "savings" to unjust enrichment. The State's character-
izations and arguments for expansive restitution stretch the concept
of precedent and enlarge the meanings of general legal terms at
every stage, in particular the chancery characterization and the
restitution characterization. The State's emergency and indemnity
arguments require a court to accept large extensions to succeed. If
the State's arguments displayed more thorough research and a
deeper understanding of the vocabulary and distinctions of reme-
dies, law-equity and restitution, they would command more
credibility.
A litigant who asks a court to stand on existing law almost
always has the easier time. The tobacco companies' documents do
not, however, rise to the State's creativity and they sink below the
State's understanding of the basics. The tobacco companies'
documents, moreover, never show an understanding of legal
restitution separate from equitable restitution.3 5 They never come
to grips with Restatement section l's freestanding restitution based
on unjust enrichment.
One of the tobacco companies' misstatements is "restitution
demands that the plaintiff be a volunteer."3 6 My first reading was
. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition at 20, Moore ex rel. State v. American
Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed Feb. 22, 1996).
' Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition at 27, Moore (No. 94-1429).
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that the typo-gremlin had dropped a "not" after "plaintiff." Basic
restitution doctrine is exactly the opposite: no restitution to a
volunteer.33 ' Credibility lost because of a burden like this is hard to
recover. The tobacco companies' miscue, it seems to me, may have
occurred because their documents never really analyze the State's
restitution arguments beyond restitution-indemnity; to succeed, an
indemnity claimant must have paid the injured person under
"compulsion," or legal liability; an indemnity plaintiff cannot be a
"volunteer" who paid the injured person without compulsion. This
is part of the idea that an indemnity defendant may insist on proof
of its liability to the injured person.33 s But this narrow usage cannot
be generalized to the entire field of restitution where the volunteer
is explicitly disqualified.
Courts even at the highest level deal with unsound contentions
based on language wrenched out of context, incorrect arguments,
and positions unsupported by any precedent.3 ' Distinguishing a
bad argument from a good one whose time has not yet come requires
study and perspicuity; determining whether a good argument's time
has come takes discernment and professional judgment. Requests
like the State's for new distinctions, novel characterizations, and
enlarged restitution based on expanding general language and
stretching precedent may simply startle judges accustomed to the
established legal categories. Other judges may recognize lawyers'
creative arguments for new directions and either reject them after
considering the pros and cons or adopt them as based in sound
public policy." '
XII. A MODEST PREDICTION
The usual test of a lawyer's creative argument is whether a court
accepts it. For, as Holmes wrote, "the prophecies of what the courts
3 PALMER, supra note 196, ch. 9.
" Keys v. Rehabilitation Ctrs., Inc., 574 So.2d 579, 585-86 (Miss. 1990).
' Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 422, 428-29 (1994).
*4o See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985) (declining to abolish common law
punitive damages, but accepting defendanes argument to raise defendant's misconduct
threshold for punitive damages to express or implied malice and to require clear and
convincing evidence before imposing them).
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will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law."34' To get some idea of how the State's approach of
characterization and expanded or broad section 1 restitution based
on defendant's savings as a benefit might have fared, let us examine
two recent inventive efforts to convince courts to characterize
something else as "restitution."
The issue in the first, Boeing v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,342
was whether an insured's environmental "response costs" are
"damages" covered under standard insurance policies. The environ-
mental authorities found that the insured generated and trans-
ported hazardous substances at its site.3 4' These substances caused
contamination.3 4 The authorities incurred "response costs," as
defined by statute, in cleaning the substances up.345 The statute
defines the costs of "response" to include costs of removal of
hazardous substances from the environment and the costs of other
remedial work.3 41 It provides that any person or business entity
responsible for a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances "shall be liable for all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the State."347 The insured expected to be indemnified
under its policy for these "response costs."
348
The operative coverage provision of the insured's insurance policy
provided that its insurer will pay on behalf of the insured "all sums
which the insured shall become obligated to pay ... for damages
." because of bodily injury or property damage to which this policy
applies, caused by an occurrence. 49 The policy did not define
"damages."
The insurance company developed a novel argument for restitu-
tion. Maintaining that response costs are not "damages," it argued
as follows. The legal technical meaning of "damages" includes
monetary compensation for injury but not monetary equitable
"' Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
342 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
343 Id. at 509-10.
344 Id.
34 Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1997).
347 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).




remedies such as sums paid for restitution. Response cost liability
is restitution because a plaintiff seeking response costs is asking for
the return of money it spent on behalf of the responsible party to
safeguard public health.
Response cost recovery restores the status quo by returning to
the plaintiff what rightfully belongs to it. A response cost defendant
like the insured has been "unjustly enriched" because it saved the
cost of preventing contamination. The legislature recognized that
corporate polluters like the insured have reaped enormous benefits
from their past inadequate waste disposal practices. These
practices created significant short-term savings for polluters,
resulting in higher profits for them, but they caused enormous
long-term harm in the form of environmental degradation. Re-
sponse cost liability is restitution which forces these polluters to
disgorge these profits.
The court rejected the insurance company's argument for
restitution.35 ° The insured's contamination has been an externality,
for, so long as the insured was not liable, it did not need to consider
the contamination. Response costs require the insured to pay for
the cost to clean up the externality, which internalizes it. The
insured has an incentive to spend on prevention to prevent pollution
in the future and to avoid paying for future response costs.
Response costs, however, fit the ordinary definition of compensa-
tory damages, not restitution. Response costs are retrospective,
measured by cost to restore or repair. Under present damages law,
a plaintiff can clean up and recover the expense from the tortfeasor.
Response costs are identical except the government cleans up,
perhaps the defendant-insured's own property, and recovers from
the defendant.
The insurance company had argued that the insured-polluter's
savings unjustly enriched it. Are the insured's savings related to
the cost to clean up? In the Carroll Thwing sense, a negligent
defendant has saved prevention costs; and in that sense negligence
liability calls the defendant's savings improper and requires the
saver to pay the losses its savings caused to others. If that form of
liability is restitution for unjust enrichment, then much of what the
,"" Id. at 576.
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law now labels negligence liability for compensatory damages
collapses into restitution.
There are policy arguments in support of either insurance
coverage or noncoverage of response costs. Insurance coverage for
pollution spreads the cost of pollution around the insurance pool or
industry and distributes it among the firms which can prevent
future pollution as a cost of doing business. On the other hand,
large unpredicted response cost liabilities will threaten insurance
companies' reserves. And if a polluter can pass losses on to an
insurance company, that dilutes response costs' deterrence
features.
3 51
The second request to expand restitution concerned whether a
truck driver was an employee covered by workers' compensation.
3 1
2
Forest's contract with Walters, a logging contractor, called for
Forest to transport logs.353 Forest requested his employee Kinzer to
begin. 54 Unbeknownst to Forest, Kinzer instead agreed to pay
Kennedy to haul Walters's logs in Forest's truck.355 Kennedy, who
had an accident on a return trip, filed a workers' compensation
claim to recover for his injuries. Kennedy alleged he was Forest's
employee.356
The Industrial Commission had accepted Kennedy's argument for
an "employment relationship" because of a contract implied in
law. 3" According to the Commission, an "implied employment
contract existed between Forest and Kennedy based upon the theory
of unjust enrichment."5 ' "Forest had accepted the 'benefit' of
Kennedy's transportation of the three loads of logs... [and] would
be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of Kennedy's services
'without liability for those services.' "
" See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990) (holding
environmental responses to be paid by insured were "damages" covered by comprehensive
general liability policies issued by insurers).
12 Kennedy v. Forest, 930 P.2d 1026 (Idaho 1997).









The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed:
We employ the phrase "implied-in-law contract" synony-
mously with quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and
restitution....
In the worker's compensation context, an
implied-in-law contract cannot form the basis for an
employment relationship. First of all, an implied-in-law
contract is not a contract or agreement at all and is
simply a method by which the courts fashion a remedy
in cases where there is no binding relationship between
the parties. The definition of "employer" in the worker's
compensation statutes clearly contemplates a situation
where one person employs another person or contracts
to do so--as opposed to a relationship implied by the
courts to do equity. Secondly, quasi-contract originates
in the theory of unjust enrichment. The measure of
recovery in such an action is limited to the "value of the
benefit bestowed upon the defendant which, in equity,
would be unjust to retain without recompense to the
plaintiff." Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663,
666, 619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980).... A search of the case
law has revealed no instance of a court awarding dam-
ages other than these in a quasi-contractual action, and
no case in which a court treated a contract
implied-in-law as a true contract and sought to imply
terms based upon it. Thus, an implied-in-law contract
cannot create an employment relationship and cannot
expose Forest, as an employer, to worker's compensation
liability or any other liabilities stemming from a true
employment contract or agreement to hire.
The Commission's conclusion that an implied-in-law
contract exists in this instance is also incorrect. For a
quasi-contractual obligation to arise, Forest would have
to have been unjustly enriched by his retention of the
benefits of Kennedy's services. In this case, however,
Forest was not unjustly enriched. Even if Forest re-
ceived a "benefit" from Kennedy's services upon receipt
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of Walters' payment, Forest indirectly compensated
Kennedy for his services. Upon receiving payment from
Walters, Forest paid Kinzer the amount upon which
they had agreed. Kinzer, in turn, paid Kennedy the
amount that they had negotiated when Kennedy agreed
to substitute for Kinzer. Thus, Forest already compen-
sated Kennedy for his services and, consequently, for the
value of any "benefit" that Forest received.360
Kennedy may have an argument for workers' compensation
coverage. The policies of workers' compensation are to compensate
employees' injury, to spread the cost of accidents through insurance,
and to create incentives for employers' safety. Each business ought
to bear its own costs. Perhaps the timber industry operates with
informal "non-employees" whose accidents are not compensated, and
perhaps the Industrial Commission resorted to the overlapping grey
areas to require the industry to internalize the costly accidents.
Kennedy was hauling Forest's logs and Forest had avoided paying
insurance on Kennedy; in this sense, Forest was underpaying for
Kennedy's service, creating an externality, Kennedy's injuries. Not
paying for the injuries leads to Forest's arguable unjust enrichment.
The Idaho court remanded to provide Kennedy an opportunity to
prove "an employment relationship based upon an implied-in-fact
contract of hire."361 Kennedy gets another chance to show "implied-
in-fact" contract of employment on remand where he may raise the
policy issues.
A shadowy legal area which countenanced "implied" employment
contracts created the opening for Kennedy's restitution character-
ization; it overlapped the grey area between contract and restitution
where legal restitution is inaccurately designated a contract
"implied" in law. Kennedy attempted to achieve the statutory
benefits the legislature accords to injured employees by characteriz-
ing his log hauling as a contract implied-in-law to transform it
legally into a contract with Forest. This creative argument is also
Id. at 1029-30 (citations omitted).
3'' Id. at 1030.
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a novel one. The Idaho court, however, declined to approve
restitution except to reverse a defendant's unjust enrichment. 62
What lessons do Boeing and Kennedy contain for the State of
Mississippi's restitution claim? Restitution, although too little
known, opens creative possibilities to the bold lawyer. Restitution
has a surplus of vocabulary, and a creative lawyer can appropriate
some of these words to import meanings from other contexts.
Restitution's core concepts, enrichment-benefit and unjustness, are
open and difficult to confine. The two courts, however, rejected the
lawyers' arguments that someone who has saved expenses is
unjustly enriched in a way that would lead to a restitution charac-
terization.363 What does this augur for the State's Medicaid
restitution theory? Would it have encountered the same fate?
XIII. WHY SETTLE?
A long time passed from the Surgeon General's report in 1963 to
tobacco companies' executivres' statement under oath in 1994 that
tobacco is not addictive. Legal instability for tobacco primarily
results from tobacco's expensive health consequences. Beginning in
the 1960s two parallel trends developed: the government became
increasingly responsible for citizens' health care and the evidence of
tobacco's insalubrious effects became inescapable. Any lingering
doubts about the question of whether tobacco's health costs were an
externality ceased.
Both the judicial and the legislative channels for legal change to
internalize tobacco's medical expenses were apparently impeded or
obstructed. The way common law courts developed products
liability involved creating liability for harm the product caused; this
in turn led sellers and manufacturers to create safer products, to
internalize externalities. But the common law process had not
worked for tobacco. Tobacco companies' impunity from products
liability is incongruous both with common law courts' general
tendency to internalize externalities and their more specific





Why had the smokers' effort to recover from the tobacco compa-
nies in tort for products liability failed? The smokers had proved
tobacco to be an addictive and harmful substance. But, by proving
that, the smokers were hoisted on their own petard; the tobacco
companies had argued successfully that the smokers were responsi-
ble for their own "personal choice" to use the addictive, harmful
substance. Jurors had been predisposed to ascribe responsibility to
the smokers who persisted in the face of warning labels and other
clear signals on the ground the smokers contributed to their own
injury and knowingly assumed the risks of their conduct. The
tobacco companies have never paid a products liability judgment.
The tobacco companies' practical impunity from liability to smokers
has not been a doctrinal rule, but a pattern of jury verdicts and
vigorous defenses. Ifjury verdicts for smokers continue, the tobacco
companies' "impunity" may disappear. For smokers to litigate
against the tobacco companies has been daunting, both because of
their vigorous defenses and their successes in jury trials.
The State's Medicaid recovery suit surmounted two of the major
obstacles which had impeded smokers' quest for tort recovery. It
evaded the tobacco companies' argument that the people who had
chosen to smoke were responsible for their own plight; the State
plaintiff never smoked, instead the State was required to pay the
medical expenses for those who did.
Vigorous defenses taking advantage of disparities in resources
were other ways the tobacco companies prevented smokers from
winning. The tobacco companies' "scorched earth" litigation tactics
wore the smoker-plaintiffs down and exhausted their resources.
The tobacco companies' claims of privilege prevented plaintiffs from
learning the facts. Although earlier individual smoker-plaintiffs
were crushed by the tobacco companies' tactics, the resources
available in the attorney general suits confront the tobacco
companies with an opponent who possesses more equal resources.
The attorney general's lawsuit is a mixed public-private venture; the
name on the pleading is the official, but the moving forces are
private trial lawyers. One lawsuit for a state's accumulated
Medicaid losses puts together a package worth investing in and the
investments obviate some of the resource imbalance.
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The anti-tobacco legislative effort has fallen short of success
because of the tobacco companies' marketing, public relations, and
lobbying efforts. In 1998, Congress, apparently because of a massive
tobacco company advertising and lobbying campaign, failed to pass
legislation to implement the 1997 settlement of the attorneys
general's Medicaid recovery lawsuits. 64 Although legisclerosis had
killed the 1997 settlement in mid-1998, the 1998 settlement of the
States' attorneys general's lawsuits did not require any legislation
from Congress. While the legal theories in the State's lawsuit called
for major innovations in analysis and expansion of existing rules,
the 1998 settlement was implemented without adjudication or
legislation.
The social and political environment for the tobacco companies
changed and events combined to shake the tobacco companies' faith
in their legal prowess. A well-researched series of newspaper
articles, written between the 1997 settlement and Congress's failure
in mid-1998 to enact legislation to implement it, outlines the
changes. 365  While the authors' analysis of the recent past is
perceptive, the implicit prediction that Congress would effectuate
the 1997 settlement means the articles read a little like a museum
piece, which alone should give prognosticators pause.
Despite several hundred smokers' products liability lawsuits
where juries almost always found the smokers responsible for
lighting up, tobacco companies' internal polling revealed that nearly
80% of Americans mistrusted them. What forces had combined to
change public opinion? Six-year-olds in a study had, the public
learned, recognized advertising figure Joe Camel almost as often as
they did Mickey Mouse. The tobacco companies, knowing their
product was both addictive and deadly, denied these facts and
developed sales campaigns designed for children. The EPA had
detailed risks to nonsmokers from second-hand smoke. Whistle-
blowers had smuggled out internal tobacco companies' documents
' See Vandall, supra note 73, at 805 n.22 (noting that tobacco industry had spent over
$30 million to lobby C:ngress in the past year).
' John Mintz & Ceci Connolly, SmokedlThe White House Offensive: Three Unlikely
Allies Built a Broad Anti.Tobacco Wave, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1998, atAl; Mintz & Connolly,
supra note 215, at Al; John Mintz & Ceci Connolly, Smoked/Congress Rebuffs Big Tobacco:
Cigarette Industry Confronts a Desertion of Support, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al.
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confirming that the companies knew of tobacco's addictive and
dangerous qualities but had hidden and dissembled the information.
In April of 1994, tobacco companies' executives denied under oath
that cigarettes are addictive. That they were even required to take
an oath raised the executives' consciousness about the level of public
mistrust.
Friends and relatives of people who died because of tobacco
communicated their anger to pollsters. Ex-smokers' ire followed, as
did that of smokers who had tried unsuccessfully to quit. A
Jacksonville, Florida jury's $1,000,000 verdict favored a deceased
smoker's family, but the state court of appeals reversed the verdict
and transferred the case for trial in another county. 66 Voters
registered support for efforts to crack down on teenage smoking.
Serious proposals emerged to regulate tobacco as a drug, to limit
marketing and sales to children, to compel the industry to finance
a campaign against smoking, to ban cigarette vending machines,
and to forbid the tobacco companies' sponsorship of sporting events.
Several features of the Mississippi Medicaid litigation, which
were unrelated to the substantive theories the State adduced, may
have fueled the tobacco companies' dolorous predictions. Mississippi
lawyer Michael Lewis contributed the innovation that the State
ought to sue the tobacco companies to recover Medicaid outlays.
The smokers' arguable responsibility for their own plight was
absent; "the state never inhaled a puff, but its Medicaid program
bore the costs of caring for sick patients.3 67
Richard Scruggs was a key lawyer in the Mississippi litigation.
Scruggs's success representing plaintiffs in asbestos litigation had
already made him wealthy. In the asbestos litigation he had
learned to spend money in advance and to negotiate settlements.
Scruggs, who put up five million dollars to finance the lawsuit, was
a law school classmate of Mississippi Attorney General Michael
Moore, and his brother-in-law is Mississippi United States Senator
' Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick, 717 So.2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998). In February 1999, after a former smoker with inoperable lung cancer received a San
Francisco jury's verdicts for $1,500,000 compensatory damages and $50,000,000 punitive
damages, the defendant Philip Morris's stock fell 8% in one day. John Schwartz, Jury Awards
Ex-Srnoker $51.5 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999, at A3.
' John Mintz & Ceci Connoley, Wounding the Giant, WASH. POST, Mar. 30,1998, at Al.
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and Majority Leader Trent Lott. The State's lawsuit was filed in
Scruggs's hometown of Pascagoula, in Jackson County on the Gulf
Coast, a strategy known, at least in the South, as "home cookin'."
The State plaintiffs cultivated close relationships with tobacco
companies' whistleblowers and the public-health community. With
Attorney General Moore, Scruggs persuaded thirty-nine other states
to file similar actions. Retiring Michigan Attorney General Frank
Kelley is quoted as attributing the 1998 settlement to the "sheer
numbers," what eventually became fourty-six states bringing
"economic pressure" to bear on the tobacco companies. The states'
group litigation efforts took thirty years to develop and the 1998
settlement was "the culmination of collective efforts on consumer
protection and antitrust and other issues."368 The aggregate effect
of the combination of tobacco companies' whistleblowers with the
states' investigation, disclosure, and discovery is revealed by one
statistic: 33,000,000 pages of internal tobacco industry documents
are available from the Minnesota litigation.
36 9
Back in Jackson County, Mississippi, trial Judge-Chancellor
William Myers's rulings favored the State; the Mississippi Supreme
Court's procedural rulings did also.370 After the Mississippi
Supreme Court's preliminary decisions, Philip Morris stock
tumbled 8%.371 "Wall Street saw that a billion-dollar-plus ruling
might release spasms of like judgments." '372
Finally, quoting from The Washington Post, the tobacco compa-
nies' lawyers were out of their depth. "Cigarette executives say the
industry's legions of big-city litigators were flummoxed by the
Mississippi case. 'These $500-an-hour company lawyers didn't
' Eric Freedman, Pioneer of AG-as-Activist to RetireAfter 37 Years, NATLL.J., Dec. 28,
1998-Jan. 4, 1999, at A6.
Hubert Humphrey HI, supra note 13, at 474.
170 In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So.2d 424 (Miss. 1997); In re Fordice, 691 So.2d
429 (Miss. 1997). The tobacco companies and other defendants sought appellate review by
(1) extraordinary writ of the chancellor's decisions on pretrial motions, and (2) an original
action for declaratory judgment-extraordinary writ filed in the supreme court. The focus was
on the attorney general's authority to sue. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused review
on the ground that the defendants ought to wait for a final judgment and then appeal in an
orderly way.




understand small southern towns,' said one tobacco industry
attorney. 'They were bamboozled.' ""
So, after the Mississippi Supreme Court's preliminary procedural
decision, the tobacco companies no longer wanted to face a Chancery
trial on the issues of whether they had been unjustly enriched and,
if so, how much they should pay. The paradigm had moved. But not
because of professors' articles or judges' opinions. The companies
and the State settled.
The law of restitution, as it has been developed and presently
stands, must be stretched and expanded before it will encompass
the State's unjust enrichment-restitution argument. Settlement
may have made perfect political or business sense to the tobacco
companies. But, in light of the law on the tobacco companies' side,
settlement did not make a lot of legal sense. They, however, may
not have caught on. Understanding neither the courthouse culture
nor the substantive law, the tobacco companies may have been
"flummoxed" and "bamboozled" on both levels.
Rendleman's rule: Don't decide that because Southerners talk
slower than you do, they think slower too. That's a big mistake.
XIV. LEGITIMACY - LEGISLATION - LITIGATION - SETTLEMENT
Legal change usually involves litigation, legislation, or a
combination. Common law courts tend to reduce externalities, to
force businesses to pay their own overhead. Tobacco companies'
overhead came to be seen to include the government's medical
expenses for smokers. The question has been how to implement this
insight. Legislation and litigation had not worked to reverse the
paradigm of "tobacco companies win." Internalization occurred
through settlement.
The Economist magazine denounced a trend that "poses a bigger
threat to Americans than either tobacco or guns." '374 "American
public officials have usurped democratic debate on both tobacco and
handguns by launching a wave of lawsuits designed to win through
3 Id.
... When Lawsuits Make Policy, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 17.
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legal threats what they have been unable to win in Congress and
state legislatures-stricter regulation and heavier taxation."3"5
In the states' common law legal cultures, however, legislation is
not the sole path to public policy; civil litigation is recognized as a
normal way to create and establish new legal rules. "Civil litiga-
tion," as Professor Owen Fiss reminded us, "is an institutional
arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality
closer to our chosen ideals."
316
Like most civil litigation, the Mississippi Medicaid recovery
action ended with a negotiated settlement. Settlements have
advantages for litigants in addition to saving time and reducing
litigation expenses. Liberated from the limitations of substantive
entitlements and blunt judicial remedies, the parties' settlement
may deal with relationship issues unique to the dispute and
distribute the give and take creatively. Unlike most civil litigation,
the Mississippi lawsuit, because of its official plaintiff, the State's
creative substantive theories, and its high stakes, was anything but
routine.
Settlement, Professor Fiss continued, reduces "the social function
of the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes.""7 "Adjudication
uses public resources and employs.., public officials chosen by a
process in which the public participates.... These officials...
possess a power that has been defined and conferred by public law,
not by private agreement.... Their job is... to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution, [the common law], and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them. This duty is not
discharged when the parties settle. 378  When litigants settle,
"society gets less than what appears, and for a price it does not
know it is paying. Parties might settle leaving justice undone." '79
Might the Mississippi tobacco settlement bear out Professor
Fiss's qualms? If adjudication leads to adversary argument and
reasoned articulation grounded on principle, settlement privatizes
.375 Id.
.37' Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).





the substantive law. The development of a private legal system
jeopardizes the rule of law as Professor Fiss defined it. The tobacco
settlement bypassed the ordinary process of changing the law
through either legislation or common law adjudication.
What consequences does this detour have? For Professor Roger
Crampton, the potential conflicts of interest in the 1997 tobacco
settlement raised "fundamental questions about the way in which
political institutions should operate."38 According to Professor
Crampton the private lawyers are interested in income, the state
attorney generals are interested in political advancement, and the
tobacco companies' lawyers' interest lies in protecting their
clients.381 Liberation from substantive law, legal remedies, and
formal adjudication has disadvantages which may exceed their
advantages. The public interest may receive short shrift.
More clarity about how the settlement comports with existing
positive law would boost its credibility and quell some criticism.
Professor Tom Mason, expressed his curiosity at a panel on the 1997
settlement.382 "I'll say I'm really sorry that they settled this thing
because they had some completely unique legal theories.... I wish
I could have seen that law either being made or at least seen the
court have an opportunity to deal with them."
3 3
Before most litigants settle a lawsuit, they assess the substantive
law and forecast the way a court will be likely to apply it. The
State's characterizations and restitution arguments, although based
on incomplete research and unpolished analysis, reached out to
grasp the forward edge of the common law's creative possibilities.
The State's arguments stretched the existing law in ways most
academic restitution specialists and appellate courts would probably
have rejected. Most defendants would have sought definitive
adjudication.
This settlement focuses attention on the tenure-review anomaly.
If, as I have speculated above, the State's restitution arguments
-o Peter Carstensen, et al., The So-Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications
for Public Health and Public Policy-An Executive Summary of a Conference at the University
of Wisconsin Law School, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 705, 723 (1998).
38' Id. at 722-23.
182 Panel Discussion, supra note 7.
m Id. at 881.
932 [Vol. 33:847
COMMON LAW RESTITUTION
would probably have been skeptically received by well-briefed
appellate courts and academic restitution specialists, how could the
same arguments have been the foundation for the settlement?
Although law professors are often criticized for promulgating
impractical theory, this particular professor is perplexed by the
tobacco companies' acceptance of the State's bold characterizations
and pie-in-the-sky restitution arguments.
The settlement has risks. First, a settlement may lack
policymaking legitimacy, because it simultaneously usurps the
elective legislative process and short-circuits the common law
process of adversary argumentation leading to reasoned judicial
articulation. A response is the one made above-you professors pay
excessive attention to theory. As Milsom observed, "But practitio-
ners and judges do not normally give a pin for legal development.
Their duty is to these clients and the proper disposition of this
case."
384
My reply is the settlement's second risk. The public's interest,
including the present and potential individual smokers' and the
taxpayers', may be clouded in the dust of lawyers' zeal to represent
clients. More definitely, the settling litigants did not focus on
addition in general or on youth smoking in particular; the settle-
ment allows the state legislatures to appropriate money without
being subjected to the discipline of taxing; most of the settlement
proceeds will not be used to reduce or prevent smoking.
The Mississippi settlement appears to me to have been made
either in a state of optimistic innocence of the law of restitution or
of indifference to it, perhaps both. As Professor Andrew Kull
patiently explained in a telephone conversation, "If you have a
settlement, you don't need a theory." But to settle intelligently, you
at least need to have a clue.
So Professor Mason, although this effort will neither answer all
your questions nor quiet all your concerns, it ought, at least, to
dispel the notion that the Mississippi settlement was based on a
thoughtful analysis of the facts in light of the substantive law which
led to a calculated estimate that liability for restitution was likely.
'u4 MILSOM, supra note 74, at 77.
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